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Foreword  
 
It is my very real pleasure to have the opportunity to write the foreword to this 
important new book by Dr. Fotios Fitsilis. The focus of his work is on how to reg-
ulate advanced algorithms, where the emergence of new technologies continues to 
present challenges for, among other things, science, law, and politics. For public 
lawyers, advanced algorithms raise particular questions about core aspects of con-
stitutional and administrative law, including as to the nature and identity of algo-
rithmic decision-makers, the manner in which decisions might be reviewed (and 
upon which grounds), and broader matters about accountability and control, not to 
mention conceptions of privacy. Such questions provide much of the backdrop to 
Dr. Fitsilis’ book, which offers novel and insightful answers about some of the 
ways forward. I imagine that his commentary will become a key reference point 
for people working in this field.   
Dr. Fitsilis’ work focuses upon the role that two sets of actors might play in re-
lation to advanced algorithms: regulatory bodies which operate within systems of 
multilevel governance; and Parliaments. He begins his analysis by examining how 
algorithms have evolved and how they now intersect with legal values such as 
non-discrimination, accountability and transparency. This provides the basis for a 
study of a number of key cases/legal moments involving algorithms, where he 
notes the approaches within a range of different jurisdictions and proposes a future 
role for a European algorithmic regulator. The remainder of his work considers the 
particular function that Parliaments might perform moving forward, where he ar-
gues that legislatures and executives need to work in tandem with technical and 
private-sector actors to set the parameters within which advanced algorithms 
might be developed. He here highlights the role that Parliamentary Research Ser-
vices might play given their expertise and experience. 
There are many reasons why Dr. Fitsilis’ book might be regarded as important, 
though I would highlight two in particular. The first is that it represents a truly in-
terdisciplinary approach to the topic at hand, as Dr. Fitsilis has a background in 
engineering and economics, as well as law. This is where much of the strength of 
his book is to be found, as the analysis within it borrows from his experience of 
working within and across those different academic disciplines. I would also note 
that he presently works within the Hellenic Parliament and that he thereby has a 
unique understanding of some of the issues that are analysed.  
The second reason concerns the institutional setting in which many of the 
book’s ideas were developed, namely the Academy of European Public Law in 
Greece. That Academy was founded in 1995 at a time when public law remained 
in a more traditional form, but its mission has since expanded given the challenges 
that public law now faces. Dr. Fitsilis’ book stands as one of the most prominent 
examples of that expansion, and it is a testimony to his intellectual ability that he 
has been able to bring together his backgrounds in science and law. He is to be 
warmly congratulated on having done so in the form of this compelling and en-
gaging book.   
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Queen’s University, Belfast 
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28 June 2019 
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Preface 
 
Any end time scenario is a good reason to tackle the causing issue with scientific 
method and precision. This may very well be the case with Artificial Intelligence 
(AI). When discussing AI, most people think of so-called ‘Artificial General Intel-
ligence’ (AGI), which refers, however, to the broader goal of reaching human-like 
intelligence, rather than to a single technology, or bunch of technologies. This 
goal is gradually approached through the inception of intelligent algorithms, i.e. 
special computer programs, rather than complex hardware, which are influencing 
an ever-expanding number of human activities. Within the course of this book, the 
notion of ‘advanced algorithms’ is developed to describe this kind of computer 
software, while calling for a timely regulation through well-defined, structured 
principles and dedicated government agencies with an oversight mandate. 
   My interest in the topic was sparked by my general research on the future of par-
liaments. Like every organization, parliaments will need to evolve to respond to 
digital challenges, otherwise they risk losing significance in the powers balance.  
Indeed, the concept of the ‘smart’ parliament involves the establishment of digital 
services for both internal and external (i.e. citizens) stakeholders. Among others, 
future parliaments will find themselves in the position of debating and examining 
the necessity to impose regulations to cover the use of advanced algorithms. Upon 
which criteria will the Members of Parliaments (MPs) decide? What kind of tech-
nical support and consultation would be necessary for them to reach educated, in-
formed and sustainable law-making decisions?  
While attempting to respond to such questions in some of my previous articles, 
it quickly became clear that the field of regulation of advanced algorithms needs 
to be widened to include both the administrative and the judicial levels. My un-
derstanding was further strengthened after attending a pair of workshops in 2017 
and 2018, in Athens, Greece, under the name ‘Artificial Cosmoi and the Law’, or-
ganized, among others, by the Centre for Law, Economics and Society of Univer-
sity College London. This book as such builds upon a series of lectures on admin-
istrative law during the 2017 and 2018 sessions of the Academy of European 
Public Law, the essence of which was gradually developed and brought to the pre-
sent form.  
There were numerous challenges encountered whilst writing this book, mostly 
dealing with methodological issues as well as with the holistic approach that was 
apparently needed to discuss an omnipresent topic. Hence, a comparative legal 
perspective is not methodologically intended but necessary to shed light on the re-
sponse of different legal orders to certain effects of advanced algorithms. In addi-
tion, there were inherent difficulties in choosing representative examples of algo-
rithmic regulation from innumerous cases with significant national or international 
impact. There are just a few examples for regulating algorithms per dedicated le-
gal provisions (the MiFID (EU) and the GDPR (EU) constitute exceptions to this 
rule and are therefore examined in detail later). The decision was therefore taken 
to select cases that were ruled on grounds of major areas of law, such as competi-
vi 
tion, labor, environment, data-protection, consumer protection law and others. As 
a result, eight prominent case studies are presented in this book.  
Back in my own field of study, the ‘evolution of parliamentary systems and 
procedures’, this book argues that parliamentarians and the Executive, supported 
by technical and private-sector consultations, should work closely together to de-
fine the legal grounds upon which advanced algorithms are to be developed and 
operated. In this respect, the role of Parliamentary Research Services (PaRS) and 
specialized agencies is of particular significance as they may provide a much 
needed in-depth analysis and strategic advice.  
Overall, the book attempts a structured approach to systematize regulatory ac-
tivities in the realm of advanced algorithms, a scientific field that is currently go-
ing through a development frenzy. Moreover, it constitutes a compact tool to pro-
vide guidance to regulators, be they lawmakers, judges or administrators. In this 
sense, as current bibliography is rather scarce, this book offers to all stakeholders 
a state-of-the-art introduction to the field of algorithmic regulation and supports 
the creation of guidelines for organizations on how to structure their regulatory ac-
tivity.  
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1 Introduction, definitions and scope     
Fotios Fitsilis 
Abstract    
This book focuses on cases where regulation has been imposed on advanced algo-
rithms due to judicial or administrative decisions. From a series of different topics 
of algorithmic conduct, a number of case studies have been selected, in order to 
determine similarities or divergence in regulatory behavior. The development of 
regulatory bodies is therefore also discussed. Moreover, this book constitutes a 
first of its kind in terms of recording, classification and comparative legal assess-
ment of significant cases of algorithmic regulation, with a view to establishing 
best practice and a responsible way forward. 
 
Keywords: legal assessment, advanced algorithms, regulatory modes, algorithmic 
regulation, regulatory bodies. 
 
For decades technological innovation was linked to the invention of hardware 
products. Software, that is computer programs, has been developed to drive hard-
ware and little importance was given to it. The structured development of software 
as an engineering branch, as stated by the term ‘software engineering’, started 
much later.1 However, it is not without irony that the sci-fi genre, rather than tech-
nologists, has first captured the strength and far-reaching consequences of algo-
rithms, the cornerstone of software engineering, which, in popular culture, are 
usually paralleled with applications of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).2 One 
may just resemble the supercomputer Deep Thought in the novel The Hitchhiker's 
Guide to the Galaxy, from which originates the famous quote ‘The answer to the 
ultimate question of life, the universe and everything is 42’.3 Or HAL 9000 in 
2001: A Space Odyssey, an intelligent computer on board the spaceship Discov-
ery, which malfunctions when presented with conflicting orders.4 It is because of 
                                                          
1 On the history of software engineering see, e.g., Wirth (2008) and Booch 
(2018).   
2 In AGI, machine intelligence matches human intellectual properties; see, e.g., 
Goertzel and Pennachin (2007); the respective point in time this might take place 
is known as ‘singularity’.  
3 See Adams (1979). 
4 See Clarke (1968). 
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the rise of computer algorithms that large parts of our lives are now being man-
aged by powerful applications of digital computing. This book is about regulation 
of algorithms. Moreover, it speaks about regulation of ‘advanced algorithms’.  
Such algorithms are also influencing traditional institutions. Originating in An-
cient Greece some 2.500 years ago, the concept of democracy is based on the core 
idea that governments are only legitimate when they are based on the consent of 
the people (the governed). In addition, according to Rousseau, citizens are both 
subject and sovereign, whereas law is the expression of the will of the people.5 In 
contemporary democracies, people have to be guaranteed certain fundamental 
rights, such as the right to education, the right to equal protection before the law 
and the right to access to information.6 However, what happens when the evolu-
tion of advanced algorithms, for instance in the form of digital communication 
platforms, is threatening these basic rights and, through that, the building elements 
of democracy?7 Few would disagree that this situation calls for prompt regulatory 
measures, implementation of these measures and legislation, as well as oversight 
and enforcement capability. 
As highlighted, the research field of the book is the regulation of advanced al-
gorithms. It focuses on cases where regulation has been imposed on algorithms 
pursuant to judicial or administrative decisions. Its main objective is to identify 
possible common patterns behind these decisions8 as guidance for future conduct 
with advanced algorithms. In the legal domain, the book examines the general 
question about the future of law in the era of advanced algorithms. Legal chal-
lenges presented by algorithms transcend different areas of law, which of course 
include administrative law.9 
In order to analyze the state-of-play in the field, a thorough literature review 
has been conducted. In addition to already published research, several online re-
sources by media, hackers, bloggers, investigative journalists and others have been 
used in this work. However, language barriers and issues of accessibility to case 
law limit this search to most ‘advanced’ legal orders. As a result, with a few ex-
ceptions regarding Japan and China, analysis is focused on relevant European and 
                                                          
5 On Rousseau’s democratic principle and the surrounding discussion see, e.g., 
MacAdam (1983); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘[t]he 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; (…)’; in Unit-
ed Nations (1948), Art. 21 §3; Cohen and Rogers (1983), p. 149, introduce the 
Principle of Democratic Legitimacy as a principle for public justification. 
6 United Nation's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes a 
milestone document in the history of fundamental human rights; see also supra 
note 5. 
7 Sunstein (2017) illumines the dangers to democracy that arise out of the un-
controlled use of the internet. 
8 In the case of judicial decisions we generally speak of case law. 
9 A concise overview of this area of the law is provided by Leyland and Antho-
ny (2012). 
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US case law. However, a comparative legal perspective is not methodologically 
intended but necessary to shed light on the response of different legal orders of se-
lected states to certain effects of advanced algorithms. This discussion is of partic-
ular importance when we highlight the steps towards the development of regulato-
ry bodies and their role, especially in the European context, where there are 
interesting questions to be asked about the overlap between global, supranational 
and national institutions and processes.  
Concretely, the book attempts to answer two basic research questions:  
1. Do advanced algorithms need to be regulated? 
2. If so, who is going to be responsible for imposing such regulation?  
While the answer to the first question is binary, i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’, there are a 
number of entities, that may impose algorithmic regulation. Several sources of 
regulation have been considered and are presented in this book. These may rely on 
a centralized or decentralized approach and may involve a dedicated regulatory 
body and/or even the parliament itself. Additional relevant issues, such as the de-
gree of algorithmic regulation, have also been touched upon.  
We publicly speak of algorithms and their regulation, but what exactly is an 
‘algorithm’ and what is meant by the composite term ‘algorithmic regulation’? 
Literature is not scarce when it comes to define an ‘algorithm’. In a 1983 book on 
computer programming an algorithm is defined as: 
‘(…) a finite sequence of instructions, each of which has a clear meaning and can be 
performed with a finite amount of effort in a finite length of time.’10  
The etymology of the word is believed to be derived from al-Ḵwārizmī ‘the 
man of Ḵwārizm’, a corruption of the name given to the ninth century mathemati-
cian Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Mūsa, influenced by the Greek word αριθμός 
(arithmós i.e. number).11 A common misunderstanding by non-computer scientists 
is that algorithms are restricted to computer-related processes, whereas in reality 
they are omnipresent and abundant in real life situations.12 The personal morning 
routine or a cooking recipe are classic examples of real life algorithms. In general, 
an algorithm has the following attributes: 
• Its steps are ordered, 
• Its steps are well-defined, 
• There is a limited number of steps and 
• It produces a specific result.  
                                                          
10 Definition taken from Aho et al. (1983), p. 2. 
11 According to Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “algorithm”, accessed May 30, 2019, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/algorithm.   
12 See, e.g., Louridas (2017). 
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In computer science, an algorithm can be understood as detailed instructions to 
a computer to perform a given task.13 A computer program, plainly defined as a 
set of instructions to perform a certain task, may rely on one or more core algo-
rithms.14 Algorithms have been at the center of the development of Information 
and Communications Technologies (ICT). Moreover, their most advanced coun-
terparts lie in the heart of potentially powerful as well as influential technologies, 
that drive social networks, trade in stock markets and calculate our taxes. Hence, 
in order to differentiate these more elaborated and complex algorithms from their 
less-developed predecessors, we adhere the term ‘advanced algorithms’ to de-
scribe them.15 Fig. 1.1 shows the natural evolution of algorithms in four distinct 
steps, from simple tasks and processes that form some of the primary algorithms 
which are then embedded into more complex computer programs. The final step 
of evolution is currently populated by advanced algorithms. Following the techno-
logical singularity, this position will be taken over by AGI algorithms.  
As algorithms evolve and increase in complexity an issue that needs to be dealt 
with is transparency in their operation. This is the so-called opacity problem and it 
is of particular importance when dealing with algorithmic decision-making sys-
tems.16 In certain circumstances, their outcome may produce legal consequences 
that have implications for the legal rights of data subjects or, as we have seen in 
the case of digital communication platforms and social media, in the legitimacy of 
governance.17 
When it comes to regulation –in this case, of digital platforms– few bring it 
closer to the point than Cédric O, France’s Junior Minister for digital affairs:  
‘It is not for the platforms to decide what justice they should apply. The state makes the 
rules’.18 
                                                          
13 Such instructions are encoded according to the typology of a computer lan-
guage.  
14 Additional commands may define, among others, the User Interface (UI), da-
ta handling, communication protocols and interaction with other system parame-
ters.  
15 However the term is not new and has been used in science for decades. For 
instance, Jayant (1986) and Wilamowski (2009) use the term to describe advanced 
coding techniques for voice communication and advanced learning algorithms for 
neural networks, respectively. 
16 See, e.g., Pasquale (2015) and Burrell (2016). 
17 In Chapter 2, examples of algorithmic opacity are going to be discussed with-
in the discussion that touches upon basic principles of administrative law, such as 
non-discrimination and transparency.   
18 See relevant CNN Business report by Gold and Siad (2019); France pursues 
an increasingly aggressive strategy in the regulation of social networks, see 
Desmaris et al. (2019), whereas at the moment the European Commission (2018) 
5 
However, there is not a unified approach when defining the term ‘regulation’. 
Orbach concludes that ‘[r]egulation is state intervention in the private domain, 
(…)’.19 In the present context, the intervention of the state implies that its full ar-
senal of legislative and judicial tools may be employed to control, direct or man-
age the development and effects of application of advanced algorithms. Tradition-
ally, command-and-control systems have been utilized to impose regulation. But 
in recent times, several new approaches have emerged.20 Since we will be investi-
gating different legal orders across several continents, one needs to bear in mind 
the paradox of calling for regulation in neo-liberal western democracies, where by 
definition deregulation should be the rule.21 Certainly, there is always an option 
for States or supranational conglomerates not to proceed with any regulatory ac-
tion.22 The absence of regulation can be an option of choice, a product of igno-
rance or even mere inaction. However, we argue that, in cases of algorithmic con-
duct, no-regulation will inevitably lead to self-regulation in order for a natural 
equilibrium to be restored.23  
We call these different approaches ‘modes of regulation’. Several regulatory 
possibilities may exist within a mode. A classification of modes cannot be abso-
lute, because it is not always possible to avoid overlapping between different 
ones.24 Hence, indicatively, the essence of regulation may be captured within the 
following series of modes:25  
1. Intervention mode:26 command-and-control, self-regulation or co-regulation, 
2. Hierarchical (or geographic) mode:27 global, supranational, national (or local), 
                                                                                                                                     
is relying on voluntary action by the stakeholders, through an EU Code of Practice 
on disinformation. 
19 In Orbach (2012), p. 10. 
20 See, e.g., Finck (2017) and Trubek and Trubek (2007).  
21 See Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004), p. 10. 
22 Gibbons (1997, p. 483) names no regulation of cyberspace a ‘null choice’. 
23 See also Kleinsteuber (2004), p. 64. 
24 The timing mode, for instance, is event driven, i.e. regulation may be im-
posed before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) a certain event has occurred; similarly, 
judicial regulation within the type mode is (mostly) triggered following a series of 
events that lead to legal action; in the following chapters, the type and the timing 
modes will frequently be used interchangeably; this does not mean that they are 
always identical, as legislative action may follow a judicial decision leading to a 
spiral of further actions from different stakeholders.  
25 More details about these modes, as well as a more narrowly-defined regulato-
ry approach on advanced algorithms, will be presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5. 
26 Principles-based self-regulatory/coregulatory measures have been proposed 
by the European Commission to regulate online platforms; see, e.g., Finck (2017);  
27 This mode positions regulatory action in the chain of multi-level governance.  
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3. Natural mode:28 direct or indirect, 
4. Type mode:29 legislative or judicial, 
5. Timing mode:30 ex-ante or ex-post. 
During the research phase we have been presented with inherent difficulties in 
choosing representative examples of algorithmic regulation. Dozens of different 
cases of algorithmic conduct across several continents have been screened to find 
common ground for a detailed legal discussion. Some of these were promising 
candidates with potential necessity for algorithmic regulation. However, they were 
still developing stories with unclear endings.31 Instead, the choice was made to se-
lect landmark cases where algorithmic regulation had already been imposed. But 
how to make choices from such a wide selection of cases? The decision was there-
fore made to select cases of algorithmic interest that were ruled on grounds of ma-
jor areas of law. 
Screening has also been performed at the legislative level. Not unsurprisingly, 
given the complexity of algorithmic regulation,32 only a few examples of clear 
legislative action have been detected, such as Directive (EU) 2014/65 and Regula-
tion (EU) 2016/679.33 They constitute the European regulatory framework around 
algorithmic trading and data protection, respectively. However, it should be clear 
that these legal texts constitute exceptions to the rule and are therefore examined 
in detail.  
As a result, a number of case studies of algorithmic regulation that touch upon 
eight major areas of law, such as competition, labor, environment, data-protection, 
consumer protection law and others, have been selected to be discussed in this 
book.34 Each one of the six case studies with judicial intervention has been ruled 
based on one or more of these areas of law. Furthermore, the two mentioned legis-
lative frameworks have been developed based on certain areas of law that lie at 
                                                          
28 The nature of regulation is captured herein, i.e. whether regulation aims at 
changing the code of a given algorithm (direct regulation) or its environment, such 
as the behavior of its controller (indirect regulation).   
29 The type mode describes regulation coming out of two basic branches of 
government, legislative and judicial; bylaws and other administrative decisions are 
frequently not possible to be issued without prior legislative acts or judicial deci-
sions.  
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., the COMPAS and the Amazon’s Echo cases in Chapter 2.  
32 The number of possible regulatory modes, which were presented earlier, 
speaks for the complexity involved in imposing algorithmic regulation.  
33 This also goes under the name General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
34 Six of the case studies represent legal disputes that were ruled before the 
courts (judicial regulation); in addition two legislative frameworks are discussed 
(GDPR and MiFID); these eight case studies are analyzed in Chapter 3. The ef-
fects of algorithms in the realm of administrative law are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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their core. In total, the eight areas of law that are displayed in Fig. 1.2 represent 
basic legal sectors that have been applied in cases of algorithmic regulation. We 
emphasize the fact that the examined case studies are not exclusively covered by 
the mentioned areas of law, nor that there is always a one-to-one match. For in-
stance, the use of penal law for criminal investigations has been detected, but is 
not fully relevant for most of the cases.  
The topics of choice are specific cases of algorithmic regulation or stand-alone 
pieces of legislation that regulate a certain field, such as personal data protection.35 
In the Microsoft cases, the conditions that led to the separation of the operating 
system from the media player and the internet browser software are discussed. The 
Volkswagen emissions case dealt with an illegal algorithmic switch, which sensed 
the operating conditions of the vehicle and adjusted gas emissions accordingly. 
Ad-blocking was studied through a German case, Axel Springer AG v. Eyeo, 
which explored the inter-relations between online privacy, digital marketing and 
fair competition. The boundaries of the personal right to block online controversial 
content, widely known as the ‘right to be forgotten’, have been studied in the light 
of the case of Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. AEPD and González. The area 
of ‘sharing economy’ has been approached through a series of high-profile cases 
against Airbnb and Uber. Finally, two topics have been dedicated to the discussion 
of algorithmic financial instruments, as regulated through Directive 2014/65/EU 
on markets in financial instruments, and personal data protection, as in the General 
Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679/EU. The main case attributes have been 
screened and compared, ranging from geographical location and administrative 
decisions to judicial reasoning and legal basis.  
Apart from the above, the evolution of advanced algorithms is presented and a 
number of considerations are discussed, such as algorithmic bias, which may re-
produce discriminatory behaviors as it is the case in real environments. The devel-
opment of regulatory bodies is discussed in more detail as the complexity of ad-
vanced algorithms and their rapid evolution makes a traditional generalist 
approach rather inefficient. Within the same context, the role of parliaments is also 
discussed. Moreover, the cost and other general considerations of algorithmic reg-
ulation are tackled. The book also aims to systematize further study in the field of 
research. For this purpose, added-value is provided through data visualization by a 
series of tables and annexes. For example, Table A in the appendix presents the 
most significant court cases discussed herein, including complaints, decisions and 
other court documents. Table B in the appendix gives a list of laws, decisions, di-
rectives, regulations and resolutions from various national and international organ-
izations, which have been analyzed in the course of this book. 
The book, at its core, looks at universally applicable patterns in administrative 
decisions and judicial rulings. Analysis has been conducted to determine similari-
ties or divergence in behavior among the different cases. Our assessment shows 
                                                          
35 See Chapter 5 for an overview of analyzed topics and legal bases in the regu-
lations of advanced algorithms. 
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that in several of the cases presented, sources of general law, such as competition 
or labor law, are invoked as a legal basis, possibly due to the lack of additional 
specialized legislation on the subject area. In some occasions, it seems that a 
common law system is perhaps better placed to deal with this situation, as it can 
be more flexible. In a further step, the book investigates the role of regulatory bod-
ies for advanced algorithms and considers the European Union Agency for Net-
work and Information Security (ENISA), based in Heraklion, Crete, Greece, that 
focuses on network and information security, as an interesting candidate that could 
be tasked as the dedicated regulatory agency for advanced algorithms. A new EU 
Agency is not required and would not improve oversight or efficiency in this sec-
tor. The role of representative institutions in algorithmic regulation is also dis-
cussed. Today’s parliaments may not yet be appropriately equipped, but their ca-
pacity can be strengthened to follow up on relevant regulatory provisions, e.g. in 
the context of Post-Legislative Scrutiny. The book concludes that despite the 
above concerns, governments should not be hesitant to invest in ameliorating the 
administrative state. Still, the relevant technologies are not ripe enough and we 
should use the time for the planning of regulatory principles and law-making. Sci-
entific foresight and forward-thinking legal assessment should be widely em-
ployed in order to determine and regulate the effects of advanced algorithms in fu-
ture societies. All in all, this book constitutes a first of its kind in terms of 
recording, classification and comparative legal assessment of significant cases of 
algorithmic regulation, with a view to establishing best practice and a responsible 
way forward. 
Apart from this introductory part, the book is structured in four further chap-
ters. Chapter 2 examines the evolution of algorithms and discusses broad concerns 
that are raised over their ethical utilization. The necessity of advanced algorithms 
and of their regulation is highlighted. In this context, the application of some of 
the core principles of administrative law, such as non-discrimination, accountabil-
ity and transparency, is discussed. Chapter 3 is dedicated to landmark cases of al-
gorithmic regulation. In total, eight cases of algorithmic conduct from several reg-
ulatory modes are discussed. Chapter 4 covers the development of regulatory 
bodies and the several forms of oversight institutions with regards to algorithms 
that have already been established. The role of representative institutions in algo-
rithmic regulation is discussed and an existing EU agency, ENISA, is proposed as 
a potential candidate to take on the role of a pan-European regulatory body. Chap-
ter 5 is devoted to the new perspectives around the regulation of advanced algo-
rithms while presenting a summary of existing legal and administrative instru-
ments which prove to be rather insufficient when it comes to confronting the array 
of issues and problems related to advanced algorithms. 
9 
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Fig. 1.1 From simple tasks to advanced algorithms  
 
Fig. 1.2 How algorithmic regulation touches upon major areas of law  
2 Evolution of Advanced Algorithms     
Fotios Fitsilis     
Abstract    
Technological evolution is based on advanced algorithms, but the pace of devel-
opment raises concerns over their ethical, proper and legitimate utilization. This 
chapter discusses fundamental principles of administrative law, such as non-
discrimination, accountability and transparency. As it seems, participation of ad-
vanced algorithms in the lives of millions is to a great extent irreversible and regu-
lation will be needed in order to confront issues related to their development and 
valid operation.  
 
Keywords: administrative law, algorithmic discrimination, accountability, trans-
parency, counterfactual explanations.  
2.1 Overview     
New technologies that have the potential to re-shape human societies are emerging 
day by day in an unprecedented way and often at extraordinary and perhaps ‘un-
healthy’ speed, as in the case of unregulated social media technology. Further-
more, it is difficult to find any aspect of our everyday lives that is not affected by 
these technologies, from commerce and farming, to medical care and education1. 
This technological revolution of our times is often characterized as the third tech-
nological revolution.2 Gartner presents the top trends for emerging technologies in 
its annual ‘Hype Cycle’.3 From the broad range of fields presented therein, we ex-
tract the following as the most relevant to potentially affect law4 and, in particular, 
administrative law: Artificial Intelligence (AI), Deep Learning, Machine Learn-
                                                          
1 See, e.g., European Parliament (2017), p. 3. 
2 In Schwab (2016), Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the 
World Economic Forum, speaks of a ‘fourth industrial revolution’ that unlocks 
new opportunities in human-machine interaction.  
3 See Panetta (2017). 
4 Kemp (2016) presents legal aspects of three AI case studies, i.e. legal ser-
vices, autonomous vehicles and smart contracts. 
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ing, Cognitive Computing, Blockchain, Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality. 
These technologies have one thing in common; they are all heavily reliant on algo-
rithms and, hence, we shall use in this book the collective term ‘advanced algo-
rithms’ to describe them.5 In the past, some of these technologies have been con-
sidered as being nothing more than mere science fiction. In the (not too distant) 
future, they may very well be the driving forces of human civilization.  
Advanced algorithms do not represent a technology of the future. Algorithms 
are already in force and here to stay. Their application in several economic and 
technical domains has already dramatically changed the way we do things. The 
ongoing automation of several industrial (and everyday) processes, previously per-
formed by human beings, is saving a lot of time and resources while producing 
ever more accurate data and results. Notably, today, even warfare is changing 
compared to the past due to the use of drones and robotics, which allow for the 
engaging of targets through computer screens and dark rooms, thousand miles 
away from where the actual combat may be taking place.6 This is why these tech-
nologies may also referred to as ‘critical infrastructure’.7 
The pace of development of these technologies raises legitimate ethical con-
cerns over their proper utilization. Despite the overall undisputed benefits of ad-
vanced algorithms, their introduction in a range of sectors may be linked to certain 
dangers, or threats, that need to be addressed for these technologies to fully exploit 
their full and positive potential. The replacement of human labor by robots and al-
gorithms in several levels of industrial production and administrative processes is 
causing a lot of anxiety around the rise of advanced algorithms. Taking this into 
consideration, societies and governments first need to clearly identify these con-
cerns in order to proceed with effective oversight and control mechanisms, legisla-
tion and other countermeasures. The fact that man-made processes are now more 
accurate and fast, directly affects administrative science, as well as law. However, 
the application of advanced algorithms in the public domain can be problematic 
and may have several implications. Administrative law directly affects our every-
day lives, from food security to public safety and security.8 Thus, one of the pur-
poses of this book is to examine from a holistic perspective the influence of these 
new technologies on administrative law. New technologies change today’s socie-
ties in an unparalleled way and they will keep on transforming them. In bureau-
cratic procedures, we have managed to limit human errors extensively through the 
use of modern Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), including the 
internet and organizations’ intranets. In public administration various organiza-
tional, managerial and archiving processes are usually redundant and time-
                                                          
5 See Chapter 1 for a description of the shift from ‘algorithms’ to ‘advanced al-
gorithms’. 
6 This is acknowledged in the relevant resolution by the Council of Europe 
(2015), as well as by Pasquale (2016). 
7 See Stone et al. (2016), p. 44. 
8 See Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 26. 
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consuming. Several of these are usually repetitive and non-critical tasks. The in-
troduction of advanced algorithms can be decisive in the automation of these pro-
cedures, which may improve the quality of management and decision-making.9 
Hence, algorithms can be used to utilize employee output more efficiently, so that 
they spend quality working time on essential and qualitative tasks.  
The previous examples highlight the advantages in the use of advanced algo-
rithms, but this does not mean that the introduction of such technologies comes 
without risks. In this regard, a first question that needs to be asked is to what ex-
tent we can legitimately and safely utilize algorithms in the administrative state, 
while maintaining an acceptable level of oversight and control? Certain fundamen-
tal principles of administrative law will be threatened if algorithms are left to op-
erate without an appropriate legal framework.10 In general, the principles of ad-
ministrative law are concerned with human decisions involved in the exercise of 
state power and discretion. Furthermore, such principles offer a promising founda-
tion for a regulatory framework for the growing number of algorithm-based deci-
sions within the public sector. AI, as a sub-domain of advanced algorithms but 
maybe also the final frontier,11 has attracted a lot of interest because of the afore-
mentioned benefits. At the same time, it is being ferociously criticized for the pos-
sible negative outcomes of its application. This fear rises from the particular char-
acteristics of algorithms. In the following section, some of the fundamental 
principles of administrative law, i.e. non-discrimination, accountability and trans-
parency, will be discussed in the light of these emerging technologies.12  
 
2.1.1 Non-discrimination     
When it comes to law, many concerns are based on the fact that laws have been 
developed to apply to human beings, not to complex self-taught algorithms.13 First 
of all, there are concerns regarding the discriminating ‘behavior’ of such systems, 
since the non-discrimination principle is an essential element of administrative 
law. Algorithms depend on variables and boundary conditions. Choosing the spe-
cific variables for an algorithm is not an objective task. It is the developer, the 
                                                          
9 See Ng (2017).  
10 See European Parliament (2017), p. 6. 
11 In this case, we speak of Artificial General Intelligence; see, e.g., Goertzel 
and Pennachin (2007). 
12 When dealing with ‘Explainable AI’, a set of additional principles, each of 
which constitutes a separate research topic, may also apply, such as bias, fairness, 
transparency, safety, causality and engineering. More on the topic in Wierzynski 
(2018).  
13 See Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 6. 
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manager (private sector) or the state actor (public sector/government) who ulti-
mately chooses the specific variables for a given scenario. This may lead to prob-
lems, or conflicts of interest, since these choices define the way the algorithm 
works, thus any bias in the variables may be directly translated within the technol-
ogy into discriminatory results.14  
Moreover, there is a well-founded concern that inherently discriminatory auto-
mated processes will prevail in the decision-making because of the evolutionary 
nature of some algorithms, which is where establishing an acceptable level of con-
trol comes in. However, such concerns are not only known within the context of 
advanced algorithms. Bias and partisanship are also part of human nature and be-
havior.15 Humans often succumb to discriminatory practices. Hence, when it 
comes to the incorporation of advanced algorithms into administrative processes, 
discrimination must be avoided, independently of who makes the decision, be it a 
human or an algorithm.16  
At this point, it needs to be noted that even if algorithms engender biased out-
comes, this does not necessarily mean that such outcomes are, or should be re-
garded, as legally problematic. It is possible for administrative decision-makers to 
differentiate between applications made to them, so long as any differential treat-
ment is justified and proportionate.17 
2.1.2 Accountability     
Questions of accountability become even more urgent in relation to the use of al-
gorithms.18 In the traditional context of the administrative state, it is the people 
who make specific decisions which naturally have certain (legal) consequences. 
Thus, they can be held accountable for their actions or omissions. It has been fair-
ly easy to locate the exact person(s) who have been responsible for a specific ad-
ministrative action and to hold them accountable for it.19 Unfortunately, that may 
not be the case with some algorithms due to the ambiguous nature of the decision-
making processes. Algorithms are creations of the human intellect, which obey 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Ng (2017); Williams et al. (2018) assesses ‘unacceptable judge-
ment(s)’ of algorithmic decision-making processes.  
15 See, e.g., Ng (2017). 
16 See Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 59; Algorithmic bias is further analyzed 
in infra Section 2.2. 
17 This point is also true, to a certain extent, when discussing issues of ‘ac-
countability’ and ‘transparency’, though there might be an argument that those are 
core values that underlie the principles of administrative law. 
18 See, e.g., Ng (2017). 
19 On the legal nature of (automated) administrative actions see, e.g., Lazaratos 
(1989).  
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their core code. Similarly, in the past, it has been possible to track down the per-
son responsible for a programming fault, e.g. for conducting wrongful/illegal bank 
transactions or influencing an industrial facility. However, advanced algorithms 
incorporate deep-learning, self-learning, fuzzy logic and a number of advanced 
technologies that largely decouple the human developer from the creation, that of 
the algorithm. When utilizing such technology, mistakes or mishaps will happen, 
just like in the case of their human operatives. In such cases, who (or what) is to 
be held accountable and which are the (legal) consequences? Ultimately, in the 
administrative state, does it make any (legal) sense to hold an algorithm accounta-
ble for a wrong or bad decision? In the criminal law domain, particularly in US, 
where great importance to the concept of mens rea, the intending mind, is at-
tached, challenges are raised when advanced algorithms come into play.20 Clearly, 
it is at best questionable to place accountability on machines and complex codes 
than on the humans who realized the manufacture and programming of the ma-
chines or developed the code.  
A recent direction to answering this legal dilemma has been provided in 2016 
in response to the so-called ‘monkey selfie case’, where copyrights have not been 
provided to a monkey that shot a ‘selfie’.21 Following this decision, the US Copy-
right Office updated its rules which now include a passage stating that ‘works 
produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or au-
tomatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author’ do not 
qualify for copyright protection under US law. However, there is legal dispute 
whether the above decision tackles issues of ‘ownership’. Similarly, under US Pa-
tent Law, there is not an explicit prohibition of protection for inventions of AI.22 
Where there is no legal ground, and in the instance of AI, where this is the case, 
one may resort to alternative readings to look for guidance. For once, there are the 
Asimov’s laws, also known as the ‘Three Laws of Robotics’ (a fourth one was 
added later), which aim to protect the integrity of human lives when interacting 
with robots. Even though these laws have been created for science fiction novels, 
they are considered crucial in modern discourse concerning AI and robots. In this 
regard, they have also been considered in the European Parliament’s report with 
recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics.23 In the 
light of the above, legislators will need to take interdisciplinary action in order to 
examine ways to at least partially regulate this highly dynamic scientific field. 
                                                          
20 See Stone et al. (2016), p. 47.  
21 Naruto v. David John Slater et al., 3:2015-cv-04324 (9th Cir.). 
22 Title 35 of the U.S. Patent Code. 
23 See European Parliament (2017), p. 6.  
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2.1.3 Transparency 
As discussed above, it is difficult to assess whether an algorithm is truly accounta-
ble, due to its so-called ‘black box’ nature, which prohibits the deeper understand-
ing of how and why it reached a conclusion in a particular task.24 This means that 
the reasoning behind its decisions may not be evident. If it is not clear how an al-
gorithm has come to a decision, it may be particularly difficult to detect any bias 
in the decision-making process and to test if a decision is fair or not. This potential 
lack of transparency needs to be addressed carefully in an administrative state, 
since there may be serious concerns over the safeguard of democratic governance 
with the introduction of AI.25 In addition, lack of transparency, which is an essen-
tial value of the democratic administrative state, due to the use of advanced algo-
rithms, may lead to the questioning of legitimacy of administrative decisions. 
The European Union is attempting to tackle the ‘black box’ problem and the re-
sulting transparency issue by providing to EU citizens the so-called ‘right to ex-
planation’.26 The ‘right to explanation’ can be identical with the personal right to 
be provided with ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ in automated 
decisions.27 However, scholars argue on the legal existence and feasibility of such 
a theoretical right.28  In principle, the ‘right to explanation’ intersects with the duty 
to give reasons for decisions, be it administrative29 or judicial.30 Moreover, it relies 
on the well-founded right to information.31  
Another area of concern is related to the impact of advanced algorithms on em-
ployment. Replacing humans with machines has been a major trend since the first 
industrial revolution, a trend that led to the formation of well-organized unions, as 
a response to the threat to job security. Algorithms and machines are therefore 
trusted, to an extent, to be faster, stronger and more efficient and effective than 
human beings. The term ‘digital unemployment’ has recently been coined to re-
flect the loss of jobs because of the rise of digital technology. Currently, only 
standardized procedures have been taken over by algorithms, while more complex 
tasks remain, at least for now, in human hands. In the past, machines have been 
seen as a way to ‘liberate’ the human race from hard labor, but today they may 
pose a threat to a multitude of professions, both blue collar and white collar ones, 
                                                          
24 See Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 18. 
25 See Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 49. 
26 This is attempted via the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 
though there is no single provision therein labeled as such. 
27 According to Selbst and Powles (2017), p. 242. 
28 See, e.g., Wachter et al. (2017).  
29 In the case of administrative decisions in international law, a legal duty for 
administrators appears to be contentious; see Hepburn (2012), p. 641. 
30 On the justification of judicial decisions see Shuman (1971). 
31 See, e.g., Peled and Rabin (2011).  
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even to that of the judge. While it may be disputed whether an AI would be ever 
able to completely replace a human judge, this may very well be the case in stand-
ardized cases in lower instances of administrative courts. Recent research using 
Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning technology was able to estab-
lish predictive models in judicial decisions.32 Nevertheless, new studies are pro-
jecting AI under a whole new light, suggesting that its inherent dynamics regard-
ing employment might have changed, and are projecting two million new jobs in 
2025.33 
Another, positive this time, influence of new technologies is related to the in-
troduction of ICT in the judicial sector, as part of accepted and necessary reforms 
across both the civil and criminal justice sectors. Currently, a large effort to net-
work judicial institutions is widely materializing, thus making judicial decisions 
easily accessible and the judicial process significantly more efficient.34 This de-
velopment towards an inter-linked judicial community is expected to continue 
with the standardization of judicial documents, e.g. using the Akoma Ntoso XML-
schema for legal documents.35 When it comes to legal informatics, it has been 
shown that discrepancies in the legal outcome may arise when digitizing formerly 
manual procedures.36 Given that technology (the code) is a regulatory modality af-
fecting human behavior, it should be ensured that the law is the driving force be-
hind it. To achieve this goal, ‘the content of a law-related system should be de-
fined, having as a guideline the hierarchy of legal sources prescribed by the legal 
order’ and then be tested on whether it serves its purpose satisfactory.37  
There are many additional challenges to be dealt with when handling new tech-
nologies, including, but not limited to, the increase in existing inequalities, the 
breach or invasion of private life, or the enhancement of discriminatory practic-
es.38 These challenges exist not only for governments but also for the private sec-
                                                          
32  See relevant research by Aletras et al. (2016).  
33 See Gartner (2017). 
34 The Council of the European Union in 2010 has taken the decision to imple-
ment the European Case Law Identifier (ECLI), which is a human readable and 
computer processable code that be assigned to every judicial decision from every 
national or European court in order to facilitate cross-border accessibility of case 
law; see also the online resources of BO ECLI (2017), an EU project involving 
several partners from 10 member states.   
35 In 2018, Akoma Ntoso has become an OASIS standard; the document archi-
tecture, the relevant schemes and the general framework for legal documents are 
available at Akoma Ntoso (2018); detailed information on the rationale of stand-
ard-based management of legal documents as well as a discussion of semantic re-
sources is presented by Sartor et al. (2011).  
36 See Yannopoulos (2012), p. 1024. 
37 See Yannopoulos (2012), p. 1028. 
38 According to Stone et al. (2016).  
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tor, which is pioneering the field. However, one should keep in mind that only 
governments enjoy over the regulatory initiative and the means to enforce it. 
2.2 Necessity of Advanced Algorithms and their Regulation     
The discussion about the necessity of advanced algorithms in contemporary and 
future societies, as well as the parameters of their regulation, is a complex one. A 
basic set of research questions has been posed in the introductory chapter. In order 
to approach it in a structured order, it can be further broken down into a more spe-
cialized set of sub-questions, such as the following:  
• Is the use of advanced algorithms inevitable for open societies that need to reg-
ulate the lives of millions or even billions of people?  
• Which are the underlying ethical dilemmas when developing or applying ad-
vanced algorithms?  
It is outside the context of this book to tackle all these issues in detail. Instead, 
a more pragmatic approach is followed in order to discuss the relevant framework 
by presenting a series of recent topics related to advanced algorithms. At the same 
time, the book sheds light on the regulatory principles or guidelines that state ac-
tors, be it the government or the judiciary, pursue in cases that involve utilization 
of advanced algorithms. Hence, we will try to support earlier claims that indicate 
shortcomings in existing legal instruments to confront issues related to advanced 
algorithms.39 
Algorithms are omnipresent. In some areas, such as the case of welfare delivery 
and monitoring, their integration is progressing ‘at a breathtaking pace with little 
or no political discussion about their impacts’.40 Yet, the inherent properties of 
software that make it attractive for certain applications can be potentially danger-
ous for others.41 Advanced algorithms in the form of always-on smart home devis-
es and digital assistants42 have entered into the mainstream consumer market and 
enjoy a wide acceptance despite well-founded criticism. That such devices may 
pose a threat to privacy has become visible in the US case of an Amazon’s Echo 
device, which has recorded and transmitted, without prior consent, a private com-
                                                          
39 See Barocas (2014). 
40 See Eubanks (2018), pp. 11-12. 
41 According to Grimmelmann (2005, p. 1758); in this regard, it is discussed 
whether software can be a good regulatory tool for rule- and standard-based deci-
sions. This distinction is considered a staple of jurisprudential theory, since soft-
ware applies rules rather than standards (Grimmelmann 2005, p. 1732). 
42 See, e.g., Google assistant (2018), a digital assistant that may handle a varie-
ty of everyday tasks up to a full first-person conversation with a human counter-
part.  
19 
munication to a random third party.43 Earlier, in 2017, it was demonstrated that 
such a device could be turned into a wiretap.44 While it is unclear whether there 
will be an investigation from the competent authorities, or any legal action, it be-
comes clear that the use of such devises is linked to serious privacy and security 
threats that have neither been tackled, nor fully understood as of yet. In a further 
case, a matter of, literally, life and death, dramatically increased public interest 
and awareness in the UK to the potentially negative outcomes of applications of 
advanced algorithms.  
In May 2018, it was reported that a bug in the information system of the Na-
tional Health Service in Britain may have caused, from 2009 to date, the prema-
ture death of up to 270 women suffering from cancer.45 An algorithm that prevent-
ed sending alerts for planned mammograms to a specific age group of women is 
considered ‘responsible’ for this mishap. However, there is still much controversy 
among experts about how this ‘algorithm failure’ came about and whether or not 
any scandal had happened at all.46 A further concern in relation to advanced algo-
rithms is their sometimes biased operation. Although one would expect such algo-
rithms not to express favoritism, these may rely on existing data sets from real en-
vironments or they may depict the mindset of their human programmers. Hence, if 
no proper or effective counteraction is taken, advanced algorithms may simply 
propagate or even maximize the original bias. A source of further consideration is 
that the most vulnerable parts of society are the ones that are going to be more 
prone to being exposed to algorithmic decisions and their potentially discriminato-
ry outcomes.47 This is a notion that seems to be attracting an increasing level of 
support.48 
As computer programs and their underlying electronic systems are becoming 
more complex and opaque,49 the task to debug advanced algorithms may prove 
challenging. Such a discriminatory behavior may be either intentional or uninten-
tional. An example of an intentionally induced discriminatory behavior is differen-
tial pricing.50 The Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
                                                          
43 According to a KIRO7 report by Horcher (2018). 
44 See Barnes (2017). 
45 Jeremy Hunt, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, brought the rele-
vant issue to the House of Commons on 2 May 2018. The statement and the con-
sequent debate may be found in the minutes of proceedings of the House; see 
House of Commons (2018).  
46 Charette (2018) presents the public debate in an IEEE Spectrum report.  
47 See, e.g., O'Neil (2016). 
48 See also Eubanks (2018). 
49 There exists rich literature on the problems that arise due to the opacity of 
advanced algorithms. For more information, the reader may refer to Pascuale 
(2015), Burrell (2016) and de Laat (2017). 
50 The term is used when online users get different prices for the same product, 
depending on the result of a system evaluation of their available personal data, al-
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Sanctions (COMPAS) algorithm offers one of the most prominent examples of un-
intentional discriminatory behavior. This is a computer program developed by 
Northpointe, Inc. in US, in order to provide judges with risk assessments for the 
future criminal behavior of convicted individuals at every stage of the US criminal 
justice system. The US Department of Justice supports the use of such tools and a 
relevant sentencing reform bill is currently pending in Congress.51 Previous evalu-
ations of the COMPAS risk models were encouraging52 and assessed that the algo-
rithm ‘(…) performs well in predicting risk for offenders released from jail pretri-
al’.53 However, in 2016, a larger independent examination by ProPublica54 showed 
that the algorithm was in fact biased against black prisoners. The company con-
tested the results of this study but declined to provide access to the algorithm, 
which calculates a risk assessment score based on 137 questions either answered 
by offenders or retrieved from their criminal records.55  
In a controversial case of prison labor, inmates in Finland have been used by a 
startup company to classify data used in the training of AI algorithms56. The latter 
argues that this is a win-win situation for both the company and the prisoners, as 
the approach helps the prisoners develop modern work skills. However, this thesis 
does not remain uncontested both ethically, as well as in its essence.57  
Cases such as these have long been sources of concern, particularly among hu-
man rights activists and data ethics scientists. With advances in machine learning 
technology, these voices are becoming louder, even predicting that ‘AI could spell 
the end for the human race’.58 
All these separate cases, whether small-scale incidents, as in Amazon’s Echo 
case, or serious systemic errors, as in the COMPAS case, demonstrate that these 
concerns have a solid foundation and need to be tackled sooner, rather than later. 
Recently, ICT giants have taken significant steps towards a more people-centric 
                                                                                                                                     
so called ‘profiling’. Consequently, a used assessed as ‘wealthy’ may get a higher 
price compared to the average user. According to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 –this 
is the General Data Protection Regulation– profiling is only allowed following ex-
plicit user consent.   
51 This is the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 at the 114th 
Congress (2015-2016).  
52 See concluding remarks in Brennan et al. (2009), p. 34. 
53 See Blomberg et al. (2010), p. 91. 
54 ProPublica is an independent, nonprofit network of investigative journalists.  
55 See the relevant report by Angwin et al. (2016).  
56 The case was presented by Chen (2019) in theverge.com.  
57 By Sarah T. Roberts, University of California, Los Angeles; in Chen (2019), 
supra note 56.  
58 According to Hawking (2014). 
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approach to AI.59 Researchers are currently developing tools to help understand 
the internal operation of (deep) machine learning systems, a research field that is 
called ‘Explainable AI’.60 IBM has announced an open-source toolkit to check for 
and mitigate unwanted bias in datasets, machine learning models and state-of-the-
art algorithms.61 Another relatively new concept is the previously mentioned ‘right 
to explanation’. 
Should such a right be recognized to legal subjects, it could cause developers to 
structure their algorithms and systems differently in order to offer a higher degree 
of transparency. This could seriously affect their functionality and operation. 
Moreover, it is not always possible for the general public nor the developer to un-
derstand how an automated system has reached a particular decision. To make 
things worse, automated decision-making systems, e.g. in the form of Deep Neural 
Networks (DNNs), are changing rapidly because they constantly learn. As a result, 
an explanation that applies when at a certain stage of a DNN may not be the case 
in another. This is why a minimal solution has been developed in the form of what 
is called ‘counterfactual explanations’. Counterfactual explanations ‘provide in-
sight into which external facts could be different in order to arrive at a desired 
outcome’.62 Other scholars call for paying more attention to socio-technical sys-
tems, in order to come up with suggestions for the improvement of algorithmic 
regulation.63 From the above, it can be deducted that participation of advanced al-
gorithms in the lives of millions is irreversible to a great extent. Regulation is 
needed and several reasons that speak for such regulation have been discussed, 
such as biased operation and algorithmic malpractice.  
Chapter 3 presents in more detail a number of topics of algorithmic regulation. 
However, the extent of regulation will inevitably vary from case to case. Societies 
(rather than functionaries) will have to determine the degree of regulation and this 
is why the role of representative institutions is eventually going to be important.64 
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3 Administrative and Judicial Decisions on 
Advanced Algorithms     
Fotios Fitsilis     
Abstract    
This chapter constitutes the main chapter of the book, where landmark cases of al-
gorithmic regulation are presented. In total, eight cases of algorithmic conduct are 
discussed. These involve both direct and indirect examples of regulation. Among 
others, examples from the ICT sector (data-protection, internet browsers and ad-
blockers) and the gig economy (i.e. Airbnb and Uber) are presented and discussed. 
Recent regulatory action, such as in the cases of the diesel emissions scandal and 
high-frequency trading are also analyzed. 
Keywords: Media player, Dieselgate, Airbnb, Uber, MiFID, GDPR. 
3.1 Microsoft Media Player and Explorer     
In May 1998, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Attorneys General of 20 
States, as well as the District of Columbia, sued Microsoft.1 Among others, the al-
legations were related to anti-competition practices through Microsoft’s bundling 
together of its internet browser, Internet Explorer (IE) with its Windows operating 
systems, an action that was considered illegal under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.2 The District Court of Columbia found Microsoft guilty of an-
ticompetitive practices and ordered a series of conduct restrictions, along with an 
                                                          
1 US DOJ Complaint 98-12320, 1998. 
2 The Sherman Antitrust Act (1980) is included in Title 15 USC. Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act mentions that ‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal’. Section 2 mentions that 
‘(e)very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony’. 
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extremely invasive structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two ‘Baby Bills’.3 
The plaintiffs attempted to send Microsoft’s appeal to the Supreme Court, but the 
court declined to render an opinion and the case was handled at a federal level.4 A 
settlement was reached between Microsoft, the DoJ and nine states, which was 
approved by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. The District of Columbia and nine other states rejected this settlement seek-
ing further remedial measures, most of which were eventually rejected by the 
court.5  
The settlement mentions that: 
‘[o]riginal Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) must be free to install and display icons, 
shortcuts and menu entries for competing software in any size or shape, and, along with 
end users, can designate the competing software as a default’.6  
Yet, the consent decree did not require Microsoft to alter its code by removing 
IE. The company was only required to allow OEMs the ability to replace IE with a 
competing browser. The exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility is 
also in violation of the Sherman Act, Section 2. Therefore the settlement provides 
that: 
 ‘(…) on the desktop or Start menu, OEMs and end users must be free to enable or 
remove access to both Microsoft's and competing software by altering icons, shortcuts, or 
menu entries’.7  
Furthermore, Microsoft was prohibited from automatically altering OEMs or 
end user configurations through its operating system software, without confirma-
tion from the user at least two weeks from the initial use of the computer. In addi-
tion, the OEMs ability to exercise those rights should not be restricted through li-
censing terms. Finally, one interesting aspect of the terms of decree is that in this 
case, due to the nature of rapid change in the high-technology industry, the com-
pliance period was shortened by half (5 years instead of 10).8 
A complaint by Sun Microsystems about the behavior of the Microsoft Corpo-
ration, with regard to its non-disclosure of protocols for Windows NT in 1998, ini-
tiated the European Commission’s investigation into the company.9 Microsoft’s 
behavior resulted in the inability of Sun Microsystems’s server products to 
achieve full interoperability with Windows desktop products. Hence, consumers 
needed to purchase both desktop and server products from Microsoft. The investi-
                                                          
3 See Economides (2001), p. 28. 
4 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 98-1232 (CKK), 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 
(D.D.C.2002). 
5 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 98-1233 (CKK), 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 
2002); Harty and Wrobel (2003), pp. 200-201. 
6 See Cohen (2004), p. 340. 
7 See Cohen (2004), p. 341. 
8 See Cohen (2004), p. 344. 
9 See Gitter (2004), p. 187. 
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gation was expanded in 2001 during the tying of Windows Media Player to the 
Window’s PC operating system.10 Due to the company’s domination of the market 
for operating systems, this action was bound to lead in a distortion of the competi-
tion, since package-deal prices would urge consumers to favor Microsoft’s prod-
ucts over those of competing companies. 
In its decision of March 2004,11 the European Commission concluded that Mi-
crosoft had to disclose interface information for its server products in order for full 
interoperability of competitors to be achieved and enforced the creation and sale 
of the Windows operating system’ version without Windows Media Player, named 
‘Windows XP N’.12 Microsoft appealed the decision in the Court of First In-
stance.13 The court’s final judgement (issued on 17 September 2007) basically ap-
proved the European Commission’s decision and deemed compulsory licensing as 
an appropriate remedy in cases of violation of Art. 82 European Communities 
Treaty (ECT), if certain conditions apply.14 This also applies in the case of the 
technology industry, where reliance on intellectual property is fundamental to 
propel research and development. 
Art. 81 and 82 ECT, which have been replaced by Art. 101 and 102, respective-
ly, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),15 appear to be 
similar to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, nevertheless different approaches 
have been followed to determine anti-competitive behavior. American courts use 
rules of reason, while under European Law behavior satisfying the conditions of 
Art. 81 §1 is deemed anticompetitive, unless it qualifies for an exception, as de-
scribed in Art. 81 §3.16 
During the early ’90s judicial procedures against Microsoft in Europe and US 
managed to achieve a level of coordination.17 This has been a step forward in in-
ternational high technology antitrust cooperation. Nonetheless, Europe’s more 
                                                          
10 See Cohen (2004, p. 352. 
11 See EC Decision of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.392. 
12 See Cohen (2004), p. 352. 
13 Microsoft v. Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
14 See Gitter (2004), p. 192. 
15 Art. 101§1 of the TFEU reads as follows: ‘The following shall be prohibited 
as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may af-
fect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, (…)’; 
Art. 102 TFEU: Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as in-
compatible with the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member 
States. (…). 
16 See Cohen (2004), p. 353. 
17 See Klein and Bansal (1996), pp. 179-180. 
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broad social welfare approach to competition law is bound to result in further ac-
tion than that taken by US courts. Yet, full international cooperation in the future 
is essential due to the trans-jurisdictional effect of the high technology market. In 
a concluding note, it is suggested that developments in software technology will 
spare governments the need to ‘interfere early in the standardization process, in 
the effort to ensure that the best new product wins’, hence maintaining a healthy 
competition framework.18 
3.2 Volkswagen Emissions Case     
The Volkswagen (VW) emissions scandal, sometimes also referred to as 
‘Dieselgate’, is an example of an ‘inverse’ algorithmic regulation, i.e. a type of 
regulation where the VW Group used algorithms negatively and covertly, in order 
to affect the outcome of pollution-control calibrations and measurements. Because 
of its significance, level of fine and the range of implications for the car industry, 
the VW emissions scandal has quickly risen to a case study for academic and 
business purposes. It all started in 2015, when US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) announced that it had found evidence that certain car models with 
diesel engines under testing conditions used an algorithmic switch, hereafter 
‘switch’, to reduce gas emissions.19 These switches constitute Auxiliary Emission 
Control Devices (AECDs) that were not previously declared, in order for the vehi-
cles to obtain a so-called Certificate of Conformity (COC). However, when the 
cars operated under normal conditions, the switches were turned to a ‘separate 
“road calibration” which reduced the effectiveness of the emission control system 
(…)’.20   
According to US EPA, switches that are ‘neither described nor justified in the 
applicable COC applications (…) are illegal defeat devices’ and referred the mat-
ter to the US DoJ.21 Both US and EU use a nearly identical language for the defi-
nition of a defeat device.22 A second notice of violation from the EPA to the VW 
                                                          
18 See Cohen (2004), p. 364. 
19 See relevant first ‘Notice of Violation’ letter to the VW Group by US EPA 
(2015a). 
20 See EPA (2015a), supra note 19, p. 4. 
21 See EPA (2015a), supra note 19, p. 4. 
22 A defeat device under U.S. regulation (40 CFR §86.1803-01) is ‘an auxiliary 
emission control device (AECD) that reduces the effectiveness of the emission 
control system under conditions which may reasonably be expected to be encoun-
tered in normal vehicle operation and use (…)’. Similarly, under Regulation (EC) 
(No 715/2007 Art. 3, par. 10) ‘defeat device’ means any element of design which 
senses temperature, vehicle speed, engine speed (RPM), transmission gear, mani-
fold vacuum or any other parameter for the purpose of activating, modulating, de-
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Group followed a few months later with allegations for a defeat device in addi-
tional car models.23 In January 2016, the US DoJ filed a civil complaint against 
the VW Group for alleged Clean Air Act violations.24 Moreover, the case has trig-
gered massive civil class action and investor lawsuits in the US and elsewhere.25 
The US DoJ also launched a criminal investigation against the VW Group on the 
matter. A year later, in January 2017, a preliminary framework settlement was 
reached in the US. VW pled guilty and agreed to pay $4.3 billion in criminal and 
civil penalties, for US residents only. In addition, six VW executives and employ-
ees have been charged with: 
‘(…) participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States and VW’s U.S. customers 
and to violate the Clean Air Act by lying and misleading the EPA and U.S. customers’.26  
In a separate settlement approved by a district Judge in San Francisco in Octo-
ber 2016, VW agreed to pay $14.7 billion to US consumers and government agen-
cies.27 
In relation to the VW emissions case, it is of importance to present and analyze 
the relevant reactions from the European institutions level. In late 2015, following 
rapid developments in the case in the US, the EP set up a ‘Committee of Inquiry 
into Emission Measurements in the Automotive Sector’.28 On 2 March 2017 the 
Committee presented its report with recommendations, which, among others, 
called for the forming of a new European agency to oversee road transport with 
market surveillance powers,29 similar to the US EPA. However, EU member states 
were split over the idea of having yet another costly and probably over-
bureaucratic EU agency and declined the proposal. Instead, the Members of the 
EP (MEPs) voted to strengthen the EC and to provide it with more powers to 
oversee the automotive industry.  
                                                                                                                                     
laying or deactivating the operation of any part of the emission control system, 
that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions 
which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation 
and use’. 
23 See second ‘Notice of Violation’ letter to the VW Group by US EPA 
(2015b).   
24 See relevant press release by US DoJ (2016); in particular, sections 204 and 
205 of the Clean Air Act are mentioned therein. 
25 For a more extensive, but not exhaustive, list of lawsuits triggered by the VW 
diesel affair see Juul (2016). 
26 See relevant press release by US DoJ (2017) as well as the court documents 
therein.  
27 See VW “Clean Diesel” MDL (multidistrict litigation) on the US District 
Court (2018) portal of the Northern District of California.  
28 See Decision 2015/3037(RSO) of the European Parliament (2015).  
29 See the Committee report 2016/2215(INI) of the European Parliament 
(2017), incl. findings and conclusions. 
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In 2016, after talks with the EC, Volkswagen committed to repair all its cars af-
fected by the Dieselgate scandal by Autumn 2017.30 An additional 2-year warranty 
offer was given to VW owners, with the company refusing any financial compen-
sation, arguing that a software update in its defeat devices would be enough to re-
solve the issues, without any loss of the car’s performance.31 This difference be-
tween VW’s behavior towards its customers, i.e. cash payout in the US v. 
warranty extension in the EU, stems from the different legal framework in Europe, 
where the responsibility to approve new car models and monitor car manufactur-
ers lay, at the time, with member states.32   
A paradigm shift is seen in a new EU regulation, which imposes stricter re-
quirements for emission tests and heavy fines for violations by the industry.33 The 
new regulation for testing new vehicle models to be introduced on the EU market 
will apply as of 1 September 2020. Consequently, both national authorities and the 
European Commission will have the power to conduct compliance verification 
checks. The regulation, therefore, updates an existing directive that established a 
framework ‘for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, 
components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles’.34 
3.3 Ad-blocking       
People spend a considerable amount of their professional or free time online. 
Knowledge of browsing activity of data subjects is hence important to both mar-
keting specialists and product/service providers. Companies use a broad set of 
tools to collect and process information about online behavior, such as computer 
cookies or just ‘cookies’.35 The advertising activities that are based on the analysis 
of personal online patterns are also known under the term ‘Online Behavioral Ad-
vertising’ (OBA). Several users who sensed, in the collection of their online ac-
tivity data, a breach of their privacy, began using special software tools that limit 
OBA. The use of such tools is not a walk in the park for users, as it has been al-
ready demonstrated that such software may have serious inherent usability flaws.36 
                                                          
30 See relevant press release by the European Commission (2017). 
31 See relevant Reuters report by De Carbonnel (2017). 
32 See De Carbonnel (2017), supra note 31. 
33 Regulation (EU) 2018/858 of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market sur-
veillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and sep-
arate technical units intended for such vehicles. 
34 This is the Framework Directive 2007/46/EC. 
35 Cookies are files stored on a user’s computer. When a website is visited, the-
se computer programs store specific activity and client-related data, which allows 
the server to deliver user-tailored content. 
36 See, e.g., Leon et al. (2012). 
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In addition, a lack of sufficient knowledge about tracking technology is further de-
teriorating the efficiency of existing privacy tools.37  
OBA is a major source of financing for private online media, such as the Spie-
gel Online news portal,38 contrary to public broadcasters that are financed either 
directly through the state budget or through legally guaranteed license fees. In-
come is mainly generated through advertising on stationary and mobile internet 
pages, within dedicated iOS/android apps, embedded videos and social net-
works.39 Additional income, although on a much smaller scale, may be generated 
through so-called ‘native advertising’.40 This is a new means of web-advertising 
that is thought to offer added-value to the users of online content. Native ads are 
designed to look and feel similar to the surrounding media format and suggest re-
lated and clearly indicated content to website visitors. ‘Affiliate links’ are also in-
dicated as such in host websites.41 These are Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) 
that contain the affiliate's ID or username. For instance, in the case of a book re-
view, a space that contains details to a particular book, i.e. Publisher, page number 
and price, may be displayed as well as links to the online retailers from which the 
book can be purchased. Should someone click on those ads and make a purchase, 
the provider of the original website gets a commission. 
The blocking of OBA through ad blockers and anti-tracking software has 
sparked several judicial disputes, since it can be used to blend out several types of 
the aforementioned online ads. Consequently, the overall advertising revenues 
sink.42 One of the most significant cases has been recently decided in Germany.43 
The German company Eye/o GmbH, hereafter Eyeo, offers online users a free ver-
sion of the ad blocker AdBlock Plus. This software filters ads that are listed in a 
so-called ‘Black List’. Eyeo offers companies a possibility to circumvent this 
blockade by entering their ads into a ‘White List’. In order for the companies to do 
so, their ads need to fulfill a certain set of criteria and they need to share online 
revenues with Eyeo. The company says it excludes Small and medium-sized En-
                                                          
37 Leon et al. (2012), p. 598. 
38 Spiegel Online GmbH & Co. KG, a private German media company, oper-
ates the portal; its parent company is SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & 
Co. KG; the media company is used here solely as an OBA study case as the ma-
jority of online media uses similar advertising schemes to generate online revenue. 
39 For additional information and structured analyses on the financing of online 
media see, e.g., Ulin (2013) and Cea-Esteruelas (2013). 
40 More information on the effects of positioning and language in native adver-
tising, sometimes also mentioned as ‘sponsored content’, may be found in 
Wojdynski and Evans (2015). 
41 See, e.g., Edelman and Brandi (2015). 
42 Dörting et al. (2017) offer an indication of the share of the online revenues 
compared to the total revenues for the case of Spiegel Online, i.e. in 2016 the 
share has exceeded 80%. 
43 Axel Springer AG v. Eyeo, I ZR 154/16, BGH. 
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terprises (SMEs) from the revenue participation condition.44 It is fair to assume 
that online media saw in this computer program a disruption to their business 
model and therefore proceeded with legal action against the software development 
company.   
After going through lower court instances, the case has been decided at the 
German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH, Federal Court) in Karlsruhe, which declared 
the internet operation of AdBlock Plus lawful. According to the original claim by 
the media company, Axel Springer AG, the software company violates German 
competition law (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG)45 and accused 
Eyeo of unfair competition and aggressive business practices, arguing that it 
threatens to destroy the online business model of advertising-financed media.46 
However, the court decided that the mentioned computer program which automat-
ically suppresses internet ads on web pages does not violate competition law. In 
particular, it decided that there is no legal basis to ban software that –like the pop-
ular AdBlock Plus– allowed users to read desired content online, while opting out 
of digital advertising. The BGH ruling mentions that any financial damage caused 
was not inflicted by the software provider but by users who downloaded its soft-
ware. The court also pointed out that media companies have always the possibility 
to exclude users that utilize ad blockers from their native content. The ruling con-
cludes that: 
‘[t]here is also no general market obstruction because there is insufficient evidence that 
the business model of providing free content on the internet is being disrupted’.47 
Another related landmark decision regarding filtering of content, at the EU lev-
el this time, was reached back in 2011.48 Here, the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (CJEU) found that an injunction against a Belgian Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP), Scarlet Extended SA, to install a general filter for all electronic 
communications passing through its services in order to prevent illegal downloads, 
was against EU law. The case was ruled on a completely deferent legal basis com-
pared with Axel Springer AG v. Eyeo, which was ruled on the grounds of German 
competition law.49 According to the Court, the injunction resulted in a:  
                                                          
44 See relevant press announcement by BGH (2018) on the Axel Springer AG v. 
Eyeo case, supra note 43. 
45 In particular, the relevant provisions for the BGH ruling are §4 Nr. 4 UWG 
and §4a UWG. 
46 See BGH (2018), supra note 43.  
47 Translation from German from BGH (2018), supra note 43. 
48 Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771. 
49 The legal basis for the Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM ruling included: Di-
rective 2001/29/EC on copyright, Directive 2004/48/EC on intellectual property 
rights, Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, Directive 95/46/EC on the 
processing of personal data and Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic 
communications. 
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‘(…) serious infringement of the freedom of the ISP concerned to conduct its business, 
since it would require it to install a complicated, costly, permanent computer system 
entirely at its own expense (…)’.50 
 The Court also considered the cost dimension of the original injunction under 
the light of the provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC, which requires that ‘(…) 
measures to ensure the respect of intellectual property rights should not be unnec-
essarily complicated or costly’.51 
3.4 Block Controversial Content    
Google and other search engines have acquired immense power as public opinion 
shapers, a fact which eventually goes hand in hand with the responsibility for pre-
sented and promoted content. Modern search engines embed sophisticated algo-
rithms to improve and speed up user searches, such as the algorithms for the auto-
complete and suggest mechanisms. Based on their implementation, such 
algorithms foresee the next word(s) a user is likely to type according to local, re-
gional or global search criteria. In this respect, it has been argued that issues of in-
tellectual property or personal data cannot be left to be regulated by a random in-
ternet majority at a certain moment.52 
On 13 May 2014 the CJEU ruled on a dispute between Google53 and the Span-
ish data protection agency ‘Agencia Española de Protección de Datos’ (AEPD), as 
well as Mr. Mario Costeja González, a Spanish national resident in Spain, on the 
right of the latter to ask Google to remove results for queries that include the per-
son's name.54 In this landmark case the story unfolds as follows. In 2010, Mr. 
González and the AEPD filed a complaint against a daily newspaper in Catalonia 
(Spain), which is owned by La Vanguardia Ediciones SL, hereafter ‘La 
Vanguardia’, Google Spain and Google Inc.     
The reason for the complaint was based on the fact that the Google search en-
gine, when prompted with Mr. González’s name, returned links on two specific 
pages of La Vanguardia’s newspaper. These pages dated back to 1998 and men-
tioned Mr. González’s name in relation to a real-estate auction along with his con-
nection to attachment proceedings for the recovery of social security debts prior to 
that time. Mr. González requested from La Vanguardia either to remove or alter 
those pages in order for his personal data to no longer be visible or, alternatively, 
                                                          
50 Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, supra note 49. 
51 Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, supra note 49. 
52 See Yannopoulos (2013).  
53 Google is registered trademark of Google LLC; its parent company is Alpha-
bet Inc. 
54 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
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to use appropriate tools offered by search engines to protect his personal data. Ad-
ditionally, he turned to the Google search engine requesting by Google Spain or 
Google Inc. to either remove or conceal personal data relating to him, so as to stop 
appearing in related search results such as the links to La Vanguardia newspaper. 
In this respect, he argued that the mentioned attachment proceedings had been ful-
ly resolved years ago, making any reference to them completely irrelevant. 
The case has been first ruled before the Audiencia Nacional, the Spanish Na-
tional High Court. The Court stated that the legal action raised the question of 
which obligations search engine operators have, in order to protect personal data 
of persons who do not wish certain personal information on third parties’ web-
sites: 
• to be linked back to them, 
• to be located,  
• to be indexed and 
• to be made available to internet users indefinitely.  
The court recognized that answering the above question is linked to the rele-
vant interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC.55 The latter needs to address the under-
lying technologies which have been developed after its publication in 1995. In the 
light of the above, the court decided to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
The CJEU used Directive 95/46/EC as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union56 as the legal basis for its ruling, the most significant points 
of which are presented and analyzed in the following paragraphs.  
This is a general ruling that applies beyond Google to all search engines that 
operate a branch or subsidiary in an EU member state. One of the most important 
outcomes is the assessment that search engine activity57 constitutes the ‘processing 
of personal data’ when information that is being handled contains personal data 
(Art. 2(b) Directive 95/46/EC ). As a direct consequence, the operator of the 
search engine must be regarded as a ‘controller’ that processes personal data in the 
sense of Art. 2(d) Directive 95/46/EC. Hence, if the relevant provisions are satis-
fied, the CJEU ruled that the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove re-
sults that contain links to web pages that contain personal information following a 
                                                          
55 Since 24 May 2018, this directive is no longer in force. It is repealed by Reg-
ulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR); see infra Section 3.7; Art. 17 GDPR outlines the 
‘different circumstances under which individuals can exercise the right to be for-
gotten’. 
56 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) 
was published in 18 December 2000 in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities.  
57 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. AEPD and González, supra note 54; the 
ruling mentions that search engine activity includes the finding, automatically in-
dexing, temporally storing and the making available to internet users of infor-
mation on the internet by third parties.  
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search made ‘on the basis of a person’s name’. Interestingly, the operator must 
remove the results of the search engine algorithm:  
‘(…) also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or 
simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication 
in itself on those pages is lawful’.58 
What arises as an issue of widespread importance from the aforementioned rul-
ing is the fact that the exercise by a data subject of ‘the right to be forgotten’59, 
meaning that its relevant personal information will no longer appear in a publicly 
available search engine list, overrides, as a general rule both the ‘economic inter-
est of the operator of the search engine’ and the ‘interest of the general public’ in 
having access to that information’.60 However, a balance is to be held when exer-
cising these rights.61 For instance, compared to the average citizen, the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ of a data subject with a public function or a significant role in public 
life is to be assessed in a different manner, stand-alone or vis-à-vis the other men-
tioned rights. Nevertheless, who is to decide in which cases the ‘right to be forgot-
ten’ is to be granted? Certainly, in the first instance, the search engines are the 
ones which absorb the entire workload of assessing numerous complaints from the 
data subjects. To decide which request qualifies, search engines must examine the 
related results for being either ‘inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or ex-
cessive’.62 In the case of a disagreement between the data subject and the search 
engine, the local Data Protection Agency (DPA) is to be consulted before further 
                                                          
58 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. AEPD and González, supra note 54. 
59 Sometimes also referred to as the ‘right to erasure’. 
60 Here is reference to the ‘right to operate freely’, meaning that the operator of 
the search engine should be able to operate the company in a financially viable 
manner, and to the ‘right to information’ of the general public in having access to 
a list of results that a search engine algorithm returns.  
61 The CJEU has been criticized for its failure to achieve a ‘fair balance’ be-
tween conflicting rights; see, e.g., Frantziou (2014), p. 768; The European Court 
of Human Rights has also dealt with conflicts between the right to privacy and the 
right of freedom of expression; overall, a high level of coherence in the relevant 
case law between the two major European courts is detected; see Margaritis 
(2018); The case, M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0628JUD006079810, further elucidates the state of play on 
privacy issues in Europe; the judgment provides strong protection of media ar-
chives, while being consistent with the CJEU reasoning for search engine opera-
tors in the Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. AEPD and González case.  
62 For instance, Google (2019) shows how a major search engine operator im-
plements ‘the right to be forgotten’ and the way it copes with individual removal 
requests. 
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legal action is considered.63 Finally, the courts, national or supra-national, consti-
tute the last resort where any disputes shall settled.   
The new Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) incorporates the essence of the 
aforementioned CJEU ruling in Art. 17, titled ‘Right to Erasure (‘right to be for-
gotten’)’. The root of this right can be traced back to French law, which recogniz-
es ‘le droit à l’oubli’, which allows rehabilitated criminals to object to the publica-
tion of the facts of their conviction and incarceration.64 Under GDPR, in 
exercising a data subject’s ‘right to be forgotten’, personal data needs to be erased 
from the controller's environment, taking into account ‘available technology and 
the cost of implementation’. Cost considerations within regulatory provisions are 
now new. They have been also part of previous regulatory provisions and have 
been invoked in court rulings.65 
 Also, the controller would have to make sure to erase any publicly made links 
to information containing personal data. Additionally, data subjects can request 
erasure of their personal information when a) this is no longer required for the 
purpose it was collected, b) there is no legal basis for processing it and c) consent 
has been withdrawn. However, as seen in the above CJEU ruling, the GDPR also 
mentions some significant exceptions to the ‘right to be forgotten’. For instance, in 
cases where processing is necessary: 
• to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information,  
• to comply with an EU or a member state legal obligation,  
• to perform a public interest task or exercise of official authority,  
• for public health reasons or  
• for archival, research or statistical purposes.  
Implementation of the ‘right to be forgotten’ has serious implications for data 
controllers and processors, not only to search engines, but to the entity of organi-
zations66 which at any point of their operation involve collection and processing of 
personal data, by own means or through third parties. Recent guidelines on profil-
ing and individual decision-making point out that the right to erasure applies to 
both the input and output data, i.e. the personal data to create a profile and the re-
                                                          
63 See Google (2019), supra note 62.  
64 See Rosen (2011), p.88. 
65 See, e.g., Directive 2004/48/EC, which requires that measures to protect in-
tellectual property rights are - among others - not to be costly, and the Scarlet Ex-
tended SA vs. SABAM case, which is discussed in supra Section 3.3; further cost 
considerations when regulating the internet are presented by Goldsmith and Sykes 
(2001) under the light of the US Dormant Commerce Clause. 
66 The term ‘organization’ covers here any form a legal entity may take, e.g. 
personal company, SME, private/public company, agency, NGO, multi-national 
corporation etc.  
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sult of the profiling process, respectively.67 Consequently, organizations need to 
have in place appropriate legal and technical procedures to be able at any time to 
erase, upon request, any of the personal data held. As previously seen, compliance 
to this right requires a case by case assessment from the side of an organization, in 
order to ensure that the handling of personal information is considered appropri-
ately.68 As this right in not absolute, data controllers also need to include in their 
decisions, several, sometimes conflicting, factors such as technology, costs and 
proportionality. 
3.5 Sharing economy    
The use of software platforms in the sharing economy is directly linked with effi-
ciencies deriving from reducing transaction costs, the encouraging of accountabil-
ity and competition, improving allocation of resources, and information and pric-
ing advantages.69 In the following paragraphs, a number of significant cases 
around two of the main actors of the sharing economy, Airbnb and Uber, are dis-
cussed. 
3.5.1 The Airbnb case 
Airbnb is a popular online rental platform, which has evolved into a global phe-
nomenon during its ten years of operation (2008 to date). Today, the website lists 
nearly five million residences in over 191 countries and 81,000 cities worldwide, 
while more than 500 million visitors have used its services.70 As a result of its rap-
id expansion and its inherent dynamic, the service has stirred up local markets, 
particularly the real estate and hotel industries and a multitude of cities and coun-
tries have been urged to impose restrictions on the platform’s operation, e.g. in 
terms of the maximum number of properties per owner or the maximum number 
of days per year that a property can be made available through the platform. Typi-
cal examples are most European metropoles, such as Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, 
Barcelona, as well as regions that attract a high number of foreign visitors during 
the summer period. However, the need to regulate the market for short-term leases 
                                                          
67 See WP29 (2018); WP29 is an advisory body (working party) on data protec-
tion and privacy set up under Art. 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
68 For this an organization needs to be able to assess the type of information, its 
sensitivity for the data subject and the interest of the general public. 
69 See, e.g., Edelman and Geradin (2016); in this relation, see also Interian 
(2016), pp. 130 and 137. 
70 See Airbnb (2019a). 
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is more pronounced in urban areas that are already facing housing problems or 
shortages of supply.71 
The activity of sharing platforms has caused several judicial disputes across the 
globe. A typical example involves the City of Paris taking multiple legal action, 
primarily against Airbnb, but also against other providers of similar services, such 
as Wimdu. With reference to housing shortages, the city administration in Paris 
has long tried to enforce strict regulatory measures upon online platforms. In the 
above court case and via express procedure, the municipality of Paris asked the 
court to fine the platforms for not removing ads lacking a proper registration num-
ber,72 which is mandatory to every rented property in Paris.73 Additionally, the city 
has imposed a maximum of 120 days per year for rented spaces as accommodation 
for tourists.74 Moreover, the Assemblée Nationale back in 2016 decided that medi-
ation portals must report on a yearly basis the number of transactions and the rev-
enues of their users directly to the national treasury department. The measure is to 
enter into force in 2020 for income generated in 2019.75  
In a prominent case, the City of Paris asked the court to fine the platforms for 
not removing ads lacking a proper registration number, which is mandatory to 
every rented property.76 The result of the hearing before the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance (TGI) de Paris (High Court of Paris) was expected with high anticipation 
to take place on 12 June 2018. However, Airbnb posed a question on a ‘priority is-
sue of constitutionality’77 claiming violation of the constitutional principle of 
equality before public office, which was considered positively by the President of 
the court, who referred the subject to the Court of Cassation. However, the court 
rejected the claim, stating that it does not have to refer the matter to the Constitu-
                                                          
71 In Greece, Nomos (Law) 4472/2017 (Art. 84) fully liberalized the activity of 
sharing platforms, such as Airbnb. However, restrictions may be imposed locally 
by ministerial decisions, e.g. in the case of housing problems. 
72 See relevant Reuters report by Rivet (2018). 
73 See relevant French ‘Law for a Digital Republic’ (Loi n° 2016-1321 du 7 
Octobre 2016 pour une République numérique) and in particular Art. L.324-1-1 of 
the Tourism Code introduced therein. 
74 See relevant decision (2017 DLH 128) by the Mayor of Paris. 
75 See amended 2016 French budget law (Loi n° 2016-1918 du 29 Décembre 
2016 de finances rectificative pour 2016) together with the French ‘Anti-Fraud 
Act’ (Loi n° 2018-898 du 23 Octobre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la fraude); in 
this regard it is interesting to note that Art. 24 of the amended French budget law 
for 2016 targets opérateurs des plateformes en ligne (online-platform operators) in 
general, according to Art. L. 111-7 du code de la consummation (consumer code), 
thus allowing for a broad interpretation across business sectors and regardless of 
the seat of a legal entity.  
76 See supra note 73.  
77 English for Question Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité (QPC). 
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tional Council.78 In another similar case, in front of the TGI de Paris, the City of 
Paris accused Airbnb of displaying properties without registration number. In its 
decision, the court dismissed the claim considering that the absence of a registra-
tion number for limited period rentals does not constitute unlawful behavior.79  
Apart from its dispute with the digital platforms, the City of Paris has also en-
gaged directly multi-owners who do not declare their properties. Facing millions 
in fines, owners appealed in cassation before the Court of Cassation, arguing that 
the relevant sanctions by French law do not comply with European law.80 In the 
meantime, several legal proceedings initiated by the City of Paris before Paris 
courts are suspended awaiting the CJEU ruling,81 which is expected to be pro-
nounced in late 2019 or at the beginning of 2020.   
This kind of lengthy multi-instance and multi-dimensional legal battles around 
the operations of Airbnb and its peers are also taking place elsewhere in Europe. 
Gradually, it becomes clear that metropolitan cities, rather than the state (or the 
European Union), are the most active peers in imposing regulation on the activi-
ties of the digital platforms. The reasons for that are at hand, such as a deteriorat-
ing housing situation that can be monitored more efficiently at the local level, as 
local self-government is more likely to feel directly the effects of the gig econo-
my, be it positive or negative.  
Just like in the occasion of the City of Paris, several other major European cit-
ies are considering imposing a similar regulatory framework against sharing plat-
forms such as Airbnb. As a basic measure, authorities limit the days per year a lo-
cation/accomodation can serve as transient accommodation. In Amsterdam, the 
city council wants to tighten the rules for renting apartments to tourists via online 
platforms. Starting in 2019, landlords will be allowed to rent their apartments only 
for 30 days per year, half of the previous maximum of 60 days per year. Similar to 
Paris, there is also an obligation for landlords to notify their municipality in ad-
vance should they offer their home for renting through an online housing plat-
form.82  
In comparison to their US counterparts, European cities have presented faster 
reflexes to remedying home sharing externalities.83 A similar measure has also 
been adopted in Japan. The ‘Minpaku Shinpou’, the new law for the private lodg-
                                                          
78 Airbnb France v. City of Paris, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2019:C300154. 
79 City of Paris v. Airbnb France and Airbnb Ireland, TGI Paris, n° 18-54.632.  
80 City of Paris v. Ms. Claire G.F., ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C301005. 
81 The preliminary question to the CJEU ruling is related to the conformity of 
Article L.631-7 of the French Construction Code with the provisions of Directive 
2006/123/EC on services in the internal market. 
82 See Airbnb (2019b) for an overview of the home sharing issues in the City of 
Amsterdam; Dredge et al. (2016) present a comprehensive analysis of regulatory 
approaches for four major European Cities, i.e. Barcelona, Berlin, Amsterdam and 
Paris. 
83 See Interian (2016), p. 157. 
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ing business, took effect as of 15 June 2018 and is considered to be the first rele-
vant national legal framework in Asia.84 Minpaku limits home-sharing to 180 days 
a year and requires homeowners to notify the city government and to be subject to 
additional control measures. As a consequence of minpaku, Airbnb informed 
homeowners that their properties would not be listed on the platform, unless they 
are in compliance with the new law. The fact that platform software needs to be 
adapted to check whether a landlord or a property is appropriately registered con-
stitutes a clear and high-profile case of algorithmic regulation. 
In view of the worldwide regulatory activity around sharing platforms, an in-
teresting response from the companies may be observed that could be part of a fu-
ture generalized trend. At least in a couple of occasions, the private companies 
that operate the digital platforms have opted to positively respond to authorities’ 
demands.85 On the motives of such rather novel corporate behavior may be debat-
ed. Presumably, being pro-active will not help them evade further legal or admin-
istrative action but consumers, administrators or the judiciary could indeed regard 
it as a move of goodwill. This again could translate in buying time and saving 
large amounts in fines.  
The fact that Airbnb operates a digital services platform does not mean that any 
regulations targeting it constitute per se cases of ‘direct regulation’. Take for in-
stance the decrease in the number of days a property can be made available to 
home sharing. In this case, regulators mainly attempt to tackle an underlying issue, 
e.g. provide solutions the housing issue in metropolitan areas or protect a tradi-
tional economy sector such as the hospitality industry (or both). This type of regu-
lation is named ‘indirect regulation’. We speak of the alternative option, i.e. ‘di-
rect regulation’, when modifying the actual digital platform. Such modifications 
may induce changes in the periphery software, the user interface or the primary 
algorithm.86 Hence, the case where platform software needs to be adapted to check 
whether a landlord or a property is appropriately registered constitutes a case of 
direct algorithmic regulation. 
                                                          
84 See, e.g., Matsui (2019), pp. 130-132.  
85 Airbnb has committed to adequately respond to a respective call from the Eu-
ropean Commission and EU consumer authorities; see, e.g., EC (2018); another 
pro-active move by the technology community is to be found in joining EU’s 
Code of Practice on Online Disinformation; see, e.g., Marsden and Meyer (2019), 
p. 4. 
86 It is not always possible to determine whether a change in functionality is at-
tributed to a minor software update or a major version revision that includes 
changes in the core algorithm. This would require a study the source code, which 
in the mentioned cases constitutes proprietary intellectual property and may be 
protected by patents, source code copyright or else; see, e.g., Liberman (1995). 
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3.5.2 The Uber case  
Another significant case study of the sharing economy is to be found in the name 
of Uber Technologies Inc., hereafter Uber. Uber is an online platform that offers, 
among others, peer-to-peer personal transport services and has quickly evolved in-
to a technology firm that deals with self-driving technology and urban air 
transport. Similar to the Airbnb case, there is a wide range of lawsuits worldwide 
concerning Uber,87 some of them aiming to even clarify the nature of the service. 
In France, in particular, the law requires that each driver needs to return to the 
base in between rides, thus preventing the circulation of vehicles in areas with an-
ticipated customer demand. This raises the cost of each ride and promotes traffic 
congestion, as more distance needs to be covered.88  
In a landmark case, a Barcelona Court ‘Juzgado de lo Mercantil No 3’ request-
ed by the CJEU a preliminary ruling regarding the nature of the Uber ridesharing 
service.89 In particular, the Spanish Court sought guidance in the case Asociación 
Profesional élite Taxi v. Uber Systems Spain SL on whether the Uber service can 
be regarded as: 
• a transport service,  
• an electronic intermediary service or  
• an information society service. 
The CJEU judged that Uber ‘intermediation services’ that are delivered ‘by 
means of a smartphone application’ are inherently linked to a transport service and 
must be classified as ‘a service in the field of transport’.90 Hence, Uber’s services 
                                                          
87 See, e.g., Edelman and Geradin (2016). 
88 See Loi  (Law) n°  2014-1104  du  1er  Octobre  2014  relative  aux  taxis  et  
aux  voitures  de  transport  avec  chauffeur [Relating  to  taxis  and  chauffeur-
driven  transport],  JORF  n°0228  15938 (2 October  2014). 
89 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems Spain, SL, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:981. 
90 Within the meaning of Art. 58(1) TFEU. The operative part of the judgment 
reads as follows: ‘Article 56 TFEU, read together with Article 58(1) TFEU, as 
well as Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, and Arti-
cle 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field 
of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society ser-
vices, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
Council of 20 July 1998, to which Article 2(a) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of in-
formation society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Mar-
ket (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) refers, must be interpreted as meaning 
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fall outside the scope of the Directive 2006/123/EC, which implements Art. 56 
TFEU on the free movement of services. Instead, Art. 58(1) TFEU needs to be ap-
plied, which relates specifically to the freedom to provide services in the field of 
transport. The Court recognized that there are no European common rules based 
on non-public urban transport services, meaning that it is up to the member states 
to regulate the conditions under which intermediation services are to be offered, 
thus creating additional national regulatory overhead with which companies such 
as Uber need to comply.91  
One of the many lawsuits against Uber in the US, Philadelphia Taxi Associa-
tion Inc. v. Uber Technologies, was ruled in the US Court of Appeals. In particu-
lar, 80 Philadelphia taxi companies that constitute the Philadelphia Taxi Associa-
tion asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the order of a lower court contending 
that: 
‘(…) Uber violated the antitrust laws because its entry into the Philadelphia taxicab 
market was illegal, predatory, and led to a sharp drop in the value of taxicab medallions as 
well as a loss of profits’. 92 
 The appellants argued that traditional taxis are losing money because of unfair 
competition. However, the Court stated that the purpose of antitrust laws is to 
‘protect competition, not competitors’. Ultimately, the court decision –like other 
similar decisions in the US– concluded that taxi companies:  
‘(…) have no right to exclude competitors from the taxicab market, even if those new 
entrants failed to obtain medallions or certificates of public convenience.’93 
In a further US lawsuit filed in 2017 in front of the Central District Court in 
California, Uber is charged to have implemented an ‘active, extensive, methodical 
scheme (…) to defraud drivers’.94 Uber is pricing its services using an algorithmic 
                                                                                                                                     
that an intermediation service such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the 
purpose of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone application and for re-
muneration, non-professional drivers using their own vehicle with persons who 
wish to make urban journeys, must be regarded as being inherently linked to a 
transport service and, accordingly, must be classified as ‘a service in the field of 
transport’ within the meaning of Article 58(1) TFEU. Consequently, such a ser-
vice must be excluded from the scope of Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123 and 
Directive 2000/31’. 
91 In Greece, the mentioned decision has been transposed in the national legal 
order via Art. 13 of Law 4530/2018 ‘Regulation of transport issues and other pro-
visions’ (translated from Greek). 
92 Philadelphia Taxi Association, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, 17-1871, US Court 
of Appeals. 
93 Philadelphia Taxi Association, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, supra note 92. 
94 See class action complaint, Sorvano Van v. Rasier, LLC., Rasier-CA, LLC., 
and Uber Technologies, INC., hereafter ‘Sorvano v. Uber’, case 2:17-cv-02550-
DMG-JEM, US District Court for the Central District of the State of California. 
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pricing system, which calculates the total fare before, instead of after, a ride. Ac-
cording to the claim, Uber uses ‘(…) a base fare plus a per-mile and per-minute 
charge for the estimated time and distance of the travel, respectively’.95 An Uber 
driver, Mr. Sophono Van, claimed that the company manipulated the software in 
the Uber app to calculate longer and slower routes than the typical one needed to 
reach a passenger’s destination. Hence, according to the plaintiff of this class 
suit,96 the fare for the passenger would be higher, while the driver’s commission is 
calculated based on the typical (cheaper) route, with Uber keeping the difference. 
Should these allegations prove correct, then this will constitute another case of al-
gorithmic misconduct, similar to US v. VW, where a defeat device was used to 
trick emission tests in diesel engines. In the following paragraphs, a series of gen-
eral issues regarding the operation of software platforms in the sharing economy 
are discussed. 
Concerns regarding algorithmic bias have been presented in Sections 2.1.1 and 
2.2. In the above case, decentralized decisions by each host, on whether or not to 
accept customers, may allow for instances of discrimination. The findings of a rel-
evant US study demonstrate that participation, pricing and ratings on Airbnb are in 
accordance with existing racial inequalities.97 This happens in spite of the overall 
ameliorative effect that the use of the platform can have on the economy of the af-
fected groups.98 
The issue of platform operators’ liability for the activities their platforms facili-
tate or coordinate, is still under debate. This is not a specific focus however, of 
this book. Nevertheless, liability represents one of the critical issues that employ-
ment will be confronted with in the sharing economy era.99 In the US, because of 
the determination to create a friendlier environment for innovation, decreased lia-
bility for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) was ensured through legislation such as 
§230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). In 2018, a first relevant federal 
ruling on the sharing economy stated that Uber limousine drivers are independent 
contractors and not the company’s employees within the meaning of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.100 The EU is looking forward to reform the current rules gov-
erning ISPs copyright liability beyond the Directive on electronic commerce 
(2000/31/EC) and the copyright Directive (2001/29/EC). After long discussions, 
the new Directive 2019/790 is about to enter into force.101 The underlying discus-
                                                          
95 See points 63 and 64 in Sorvano v. Uber, supra note 94. 
96 This is a type of lawsuit where one of the parties is a group of people who are 
represented collectively by a member of that group. 
97 See Cansoy and Schor (2017), pp. 12-15. 
98 See Cansoy and Schor (2017), p. 17. 
99 See Cunningham-Parmeter (2016). 
100 Razak v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2:16-cv-00573, US District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
101 See Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital 
Single Market. 
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sion on the necessity for pan-European liability rules, as well as relevant CJEU 
case law, is presented in a paper ordered by the European Parliament’s Committee 
on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.102 
In addition, in the sharing economy, the issue of ‘offer of universal service’ is 
at stake. For instance, Taxi fleets and conventional hotels are required to provide a 
percentage of vehicles and rooms, respectively, that can accommodate wheel-
chairs. To a great extent, this is not possible for the owner of a single house or ve-
hicle. The offer of incentive payments –funded through special taxes– to providers 
of universal service, is a proposal worth investigating.103 Overall, it is the inherent 
externalities occurring by the platforms’ operation that require regulatory inter-
vention. Safety is another field of intervention. The lack of contractual relation-
ship removes the motive for Uber drivers to obtain a commercial endorsement for 
their driver’s license and Airbnb residences might lack proper fire escaping plan-
ning. Such issues constitute a field that should be regulated on a bare minimum 
requirements basis.104  
Concluding, in the sharing economy, algorithms and innovation find plenty of 
room for expansion. Policymakers should embrace efficiencies generated through 
the operation of software platforms by removing unnecessary or protectionist 
rules, while, at the same time, imposing a regulatory framework to ensure the le-
gality and safety of these platforms, adapt market operation and uphold the gen-
eral public interest.105 
3.6 Algorithmic trading regulation     
The rise of algorithmic trading offers an interesting and developing field of algo-
rithmic regulation. The European Union has long been at the forefront of financial 
market regulation. Applicable since 2007, the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (2004/39/EC), or ‘MiFID’ has been the cornerstone of the EU's regula-
tion of financial markets, but recent market anomalies106 have made an update of 
the relevant framework necessary. The new legislation, MiFID II (2014/65/EU), 
entered into force in 2018 and is accompanied by a set of new regulations, as well 
as by detailed technical rules (standards) for implementation.107 Significant im-
                                                          
102 See Nordemann (2018). 
103 See Edelman and Geradin (2016), p. 321. 
104 See Edelman and Geradin (2016), pp. 309-316. 
105 See Edelman and Geradin (2016), p. 296. 
106 For instance, the ‘Flash Crash” in May 2010 and the ‘Tweet Flash Crash’ in 
April 2013 are understood here as market anomalies. 
107 The word is here about the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR), Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and ESMA’s Regulatory Technical 
Standards. 
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provements include new reporting requirements and tests that will increase the 
amount of information available reducing the use of dark pools108 and Over-The-
Counter (OTC) trading.109 In addition, there are stricter rules governing high-
frequency-trading. In relation to algorithms, the new regulatory scheme introduces 
strict oversight and monitoring of algorithmic trading, by imposing new and de-
tailed requirements on both algorithmic traders and trading venues (Art. 17 MiFID 
II). 
Algorithmic trading utilizes advanced algorithms to automatically determine 
several order parameters110 and calculate optimal trading strategies with limited or 
no human intervention.111 Although the industry draws positive feedback from the 
introduction of high frequency and algorithmic trading, regulators are concerned 
that such technologies may cause market distortion. Specific concerns involve: 
‘(…) high order cancellation rate, increased risk of overloading systems, increased 
volatility, the ability of algorithmic traders to withdraw liquidity at any time and 
insufficient supervision by competent authorities’.112  
Consequently, a company113 that is dealing with algorithmic trading will be re-
quired to:  
‘(…) have in place effective systems and risk controls (…) to ensure that its trading 
systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity, are subject to appropriate trading 
thresholds and limits and prevent the sending of erroneous orders or the systems (…)’.114 
At the same time, trading venues need to be able to identify which orders have 
been placed by algorithmic trading. Both companies and trading venues need to 
take ‘robust measures’ in order to ensure that ‘algorithmic trading or high-
frequency algorithmic trading techniques do not create a disorderly market and 
cannot be used for abusive purposes’.115 For instance, trading venues need to pro-
vide their members with algorithm testing facilities. This is an important organiza-
tional requirement, which allows companies to test their algorithms within a con-
trolled non-live environment, similar to the one that is used for the online real-
time trading (ex-ante identification of negative algorithmic impact). The relevant 
MiFID II provisions also lead to the implementation of systems and procedures 
                                                          
108 Dark pool (also black pool) is a private forum for trading securities, deriva-
tives, and other financial instruments. 
109 The phrase refers to stocks that trade via a dealer network rather than on a 
centralized exchange. 
110 Order parameters may include the time of submission, price, order manage-
ment, timing of withdrawal etc. 
111 A definition of ‘algorithmic trading’ is also presented in MiFID II, recital 
39. 
112 See Norton Rose Fulbright (2014). 
113 MiFID uses the term ‘investment firm’ instead. 
114 See Art. 17(1) MiFID II. 
115 See Recital 64, MiFID II. 
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that are able to identify any negative impact ex-post, e.g. through implementation 
of a ‘kill button’ in order to cancel any outstanding orders. 
Apart from kill buttons or switches, in order to avoid market distortion, regula-
tors insisted in companies having specific minimum pre-trade risk limits on order 
submission,116 such as: 
1. price collars,  
2. maximum order value,  
3. maximum order volume,  
4. maximum long-short positions, 
5. Maximum long/short overall strategy positions,  
6. repeated automated execution throttles,  
7. outbound message rates, 
8. maximum message limits and, where appropriate, 
9. market maker protections.  
For the same reason, the European Securities and Markets authority (ESMA) 
also proposes that companies should be able to automatically block or cancel non-
eligible trade orders above the company’s risk management threshold.117 
High-Frequency Algorithmic Trading (HFAT)118 is a subset of algorithmic 
trading with high message intraday rates regarding orders, quotes or cancela-
tions.119 Companies that utilize HFAT are required to store in an approved form 
‘accurate and time sequenced records of all (…) placed orders’ for at least five 
years and ‘(…) shall make them available to the competent Member State authori-
ty upon request’.120 The records should be detailed enough to be able to identify:  
‘(…) the person in charge of each algorithm, a description of the nature of each decision 
or execution algorithm and the key compliance and risk controls’.121  
The most significant changes to the relevant US legislation resulted from the 
2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.122 Due to 
inherent complexity and the rather new legislation on the topic, judicial decisions 
with regard to algorithmic trading or HFAT are not frequent.123  
                                                          
116 See ESMA (2014a), pp. 223-224. 
117 See ESMA (2014a), p. 224. 
118 For a definition of HFAT see Recital 40, MiFID II. 
119 Such a volume of intra-day messages would be in the range of 75,000 mes-
sages per trading day on average over the year, according to the ESMA (2014b), 
p. 231. 
120 See Art. 17(2) MiFID II. 
121 See Norton Rose Fulbright (2014). 
122 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act became 
Public Law No: 111-203 in 21 July 2010. 
123 See US DoJ docket for commodities fraud. 
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In 2015, a US District Court, in the Northern District of Illinois,124 convicted 
Mr. Michael Coscia, a high-frequency trader who was accused of commodities 
fraud and ‘spoofing’.125 Mr. Coscia was accused of placing in the year 2011 large 
orders into futures markets that he never intended to execute, thus creating an illu-
sion of high demand, with the intent to lure other traders to markets. Spoofing was 
declared illegal in the commodities futures market in the US through the 2010 
Commodity Exchange Act. Mr. Coscia appealed the decision in front of the Su-
preme Court,126 which eventually rejected the petitioner’s arguments that the 2010 
law’s definition of spoofing is ‘unconstitutionally vague’ and confirmed a 3-year 
prison sentence. Another pending spoofing case involves Mr. Navinder Sarao, 
who faced criminal and civil spoofing charges in the US in relation to the afore-
mentioned 2010 ‘flash crash’,127 to which Mr. Sarao pled guilty. The outcome of 
this case is highly anticipated in both legal and algorithmic trader circles. Howev-
er, the verdict in the US v. Coscia case was a clear indication that such practices 
are not being tolerated. Combined with the relevant European legal framework of 
MiFID II/MiFIR these regulations may be useful instruments in the hands of 
Fraud Squad officers and prosecutors, in order to investigate further cases of mar-
ket manipulation. On the other hand, they could form a powerful legal/judicial 
barrier for traders engaging in algorithmic trading or HFAT, to consider adjusting 
their practices. 
An alternative way to approach algorithmic trading is the concept of providing 
real rights to conducts that belong in the sphere of a virtual world.128 A virtual 
world can be an online interactive one, where players create avatars performing 
various tasks and activities. The interaction between players, their virtual property, 
creates a virtual economy, which imitates that of the real world. The relations be-
tween providers and players are usually regulated via End-User License Agree-
ment (EULA) and the standard terms and conditions of the game hosting site.129 
But what is valid for a gaming community can be also valid for a community of 
traders who are engaging in real markets via trading venues. Hence, as long as a 
subscription fee is required, the status of consumer can be evoked by traders as 
dictated by EU’s Directive  93/13  (Unfair  Terms  in  Consumer  Contracts)  and  
Directive  2005/29  (Unfair  Commercial  Practices  Directive), in order for them 
to benefit, for example, from bringing the case in their area of jurisdiction.130 In 
instances of illegal handling of virtual rights, contractual relationship can be ex-
amined to establish contractual liability between involved parties. The introduc-
                                                          
124 US v. Coscia, 14-cr-00551. 
125 See 7 USC§ 6c (a) (5) (C) for a definition of spoofing: ‘bidding or offering 
with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution’. 
126 Coscia v. US, 17-1099. 
127 US v. Sarao, 1:15-cr-00075. 
128 See, e.g., Yannopoulos (2012b). 
129 See Yannopoulos (2012b), p. 2. 
130 See Yannopoulos (2012b), p. 3. 
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tion of digital signatures, security protocols and procedures either as regulations or 
technical standards have been proposed in order to safeguard those rights and the 
benefits and properties of their owners.131 
3.7 General Data Protection Regulation 
Rapid technological developments in telecommunications, globalization of ser-
vices, the rise of internet and the widespread use of mobile electronic devices have 
triggered, among others, the need to modify Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic commu-
nications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications). After years 
of considerations and consultation with relevant stakeholders, the EU adopted on 
27 April 2016 its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),132 which became 
directly applicable on 25 May 2018 in all EU MS, without the necessity for addi-
tional national legislation. Moreover, the EC has established an expert group on 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to ‘clarify how Member States' existing and future leg-
islation will ensure effective and uniform application of the Regulation’.133 
Among other changes, GDPR alters the rules for ‘profiling’, i.e. the use of com-
puterized data analysis to generate user profiles. As will be discussed below, pro-
filing is only allowed on an opt-in basis and special consent is required to auto-
matically generate the profile of a data subject. 
The regulation contains well-known principles of pre-existing data protection 
law, such as ‘consent’, the ‘accountability principle’ and ‘privacy by design’.134 
Under the GDPR, both business customers and data controllers have certain legal 
obligations135. Despite the fact that the basic data protection principles remain un-
touched, the structures and procedures for the protection of the data subjects 
change. For instance, the consent of the data subject in Art. 4(11) is far more de-
tailed: 
‘‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or 
by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data 
relating to him or her;’ 
                                                          
131 See Yannopoulos (2012b), p. 7. 
132 Regulation (EU) 2016/679. 
133 The European Commission has established a relevant register that includes 
information on expert groups; for more details on the work of the expert group for 
GDPR see EC register (2016).  
134 See also Cavoukian (2010). 
135 It is not the purpose of this book to provide a full analysis of the GDPR. 
Nevertheless, some of its key concepts are to be highlighted.  
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Compared to previous legislation new key elements insist that the indication of 
consent must be ‘unambiguous and involve clear affirmative action’ (opt-in).136 
Art. 7 provides several additional conditions for consent, specifically on keeping 
records of consent, clarity of consent and the right to withdraw consent. In addi-
tion, Art. 8 of the GDPR contains new provisions regarding children’s consent for 
online services. As noted by UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the 
opt-in approach pursued through the GDPR is going to positively affect individu-
als’ rights in a sense that existing rights are going to be further strengthened when 
data processing happens on a consent-basis.137 The ICO also mentions two related 
examples of such rights, the ‘right to be forgotten’138 and the ‘right to data porta-
bility’.139 At this point, it is interesting to investigate what happens to existing data 
that have been collected on an opt-out basis. Marketing140 under the GDPR is reg-
ulated like any other data processing activity and Art. 6 implies that the controller 
or a third party needs to demonstrate that it has a lawful basis to conduct such ac-
tivities. Moreover, the data subject needs to be aware of who is collecting the data, 
for which purpose and by whom they are to be further processed. Otherwise, data 
collection and any processing actions are not lawful. In relation to direct electronic 
marketing,141 a widely used business practice, it is noted that: 
 ‘[i]f marketing is already lawfully conducted on an opt-out basis, the GDPR is unlikely to 
change this (…).  If conducted on an opt-in basis, then further review and risk assessment 
may be needed.’142 
This assessment comes to the result that businesses which previously went be-
yond legal necessity in order to protect their client’s rights using an opt-in ap-
proach, will find themselves in the situation to refresh those consents for GDPR 
compliance, hence risking to compromise valuable marketing data in case several 
data subjects will not re-consent.143 Art. 25 of the GDPR mentions two powerful 
dimensions in data protection using the terms ‘by design’ and ‘by default’.144 A 
                                                          
136 See UK ICO (2017), p. 5. 
137 See UK ICO (2017). p. 7. 
138 On the ‘right to be forgotten’ see also supra Section 3.4. 
139 The right to data portability is mentioned in Art. 20 GDPR. 
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close look at Art. 25 is necessary to further study the effects and implications of 
the provisions therein. 145 
Data protection ‘by design’ in not an original term coined by the GDPR draft-
ers. It means that ‘(…) privacy is embedded into the design and architecture of IT 
systems and business practices’.146 Moreover, already in 2014, the European Un-
ion Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) produced a relevant 
report to bridge the gap between the pre-GDPR legal framework and available 
technologies.147 Its goal is to motivate all stakeholders towards more privacy-
friendly systems and services design and development. When it comes to imple-
mentation, several potentially limiting conditions such as ‘state of the art’ and 
‘cost of implementation’ need to be taken into consideration. These exact two 
conditions are also to be found in Art. 17(1) of the previous Data Protection Di-
rective 95/46/EC.  
Data protection ‘by default’ means that privacy settings are originally imple-
mented and built into the system. Hence, there is no necessity for a data subject to 
proceed to any actions to protect its privacy. The existence of predefined parame-
ters, usually presented as initial pre-settings in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), 
does not mean that changes are not possible. However, most users do not change 
pre-settings, acting in good faith or these are skipped due to time considerations. 
Data protection ‘by Default’ implies the use of the ‘Principle of Least Surprise’ 
                                                          
145 Art. 25 GDPR Data protection by design and by default: 
1. Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the 
nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying 
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processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means 
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order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data 
subjects. 
2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for 
each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to 
the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of 
their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that 
by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s interven-
tion to an indefinite number of natural persons. 
3. An approved certification mechanism pursuant to Art. 42 may be used as an 
element to demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this article. 
146 See Cavoukian (2010), p. 3. 
147 See Danezis et al. (2015). 
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(or Astonishment) in software development, which states that the result of an op-
eration should be ‘obvious, consistent, and predictable’.148 Data protection ‘by De-
fault’ contains less potentially limiting conditions compared to data protection ‘by 
design’ making it a potentially more powerful principle. Instead, it is related to the 
‘purpose limitation’ principle from Art. 5(1) GDPR.149 According to the GDPR, 
companies or organizations that deal with EU personal data need to decide on the 
appointment of a Data Protection Officer (DPO).150 This is rather linked to the 
volume of sensitive personal information such an entity may process. For instance, 
a company that routinely handles large volumes of personal data should be more 
inclined towards appointing a DPO. In general, a core requirement that arises from 
Art. 25 is that companies or organizations must implement mechanisms for data 
protection, such as security or privacy checks, in all layers of operation, such as in 
their management, workings procedures and the provision of products or services.  
However, Art. 25 provides DPOs with relatively little technical guidance on 
how to accomplish such a widespread and complex task. There are two important 
terms that are mentioned here, ‘pseudonymisation’ and ‘data minimisation’. In ad-
dition, the GDPR mentions the term ‘encryption’ elsewhere.151 The technical term 
‘pseudonymisation’ has here its first appearance in EU law. This new term refers 
to the processing of personal data in a way that the result cannot be attributed to a 
specific data subject without the use of further related information.152 Those are to 
be stored separately, using appropriate technical and security measures. Another 
significant requirement of Art. 25 is the so-called ‘data minimisation’, which re-
sults in the processing of only a necessary amount of data for a specific purpose, 
although, in practical terms, this could be a difficult requirement to achieve.153 En-
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ed journey can be traced back to the cardholder but to a hash value. 
153 From a technical point of view, overcollection or over processing of data 
cannot be easily proven as these are relative terms (e.g. overcollection in relation 
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cryption is to be considered as a way to achieve data security, and hence privacy, 
by complicating and, ultimately, blocking data access to unauthorized third parties 
and data processors. Also, data subjects are to be allowed to access and alter their 
privacy settings and information with the same ease as giving their consent to use 
and process their data, in analogy to Art. 7(3).154 A further critical examination of 
Art. 25 GDPR reveals several shortcomings that include:155 
• ‘fuzzy legalese’, 
• insufficient clarity of parameters and methodologies to achieve its goals,  
• lack of salient and strong incentives and  
• missing communication link to the designers and developers of information 
systems. 
These shortcomings demonstrate how difficult it is to impose regulation on a 
highly dynamic technology sector.   
Summarizing, the provisions of Art. 25 have serious implications to a series of 
parameters of data processing, while access to the original and processed data by 
third parties is generally not permitted:156 
• amount of data collected, 
• extent to which the data is processed, 
• storage duration, 
• data accessibility.  
DPOs need to bear in mind the above, in order to comply with the special 
GDPR requirements from Art. 25. Other key changes that the GDPR introduces 
include  stricter rules to report security breaches (Art. 33(1))157, as well as the ac-
countability principle, according to which there is a controller responsibility to 
‘demonstrate compliance’ with personal data processing rules (Art. 5(2)). From 
the above, it becomes obvious that the GDPR constitutes a decisive evolution to 
the pre-existing EU legal framework that provides public authorities with regula-
tory guidelines, as well as a certain level of guidance to private sector and individ-
ual stakeholders. Nevertheless, the implementation of such a comprehensive pri-
vacy framework needs to be monitored closely, both at the national, as well as the 
EU level, as it is likely to cause negative implications in indirectly related fields, 
                                                          
154 See Art. 7(3): ‘The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her 
consent at any time. (…) It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent’. 
155 See Bygrave (2017), p. 119. 
156 As previously commented, access to the data may be granted with the con-
sent of the data subject(s). 
157 A legal obligation is introduced to notify the supervisory authority of a per-
sonal data breach within 72 hours of knowing about it. 
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such as in advertising.158 Certainly, the first judicial judgements on implementa-
tion of the GDPR are awaited with great interest, as they are expected to provide 
clarity to some of the ambiguous concepts represented therein. Moreover, and in-
line with other scholars, we expect a gradual establishment of relevant national 
and international regulatory bodies or agencies.159 
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4 Development of Regulatory Bodies     
Fotios Fitsilis     
Abstract 
The development of national, supranational or global regulatory bodies for ad-
vanced algorithms is essential. In this chapter, a comparison of several approaches 
is attempted. Among others, the first steps towards the formation of regulatory 
bodies is explained. Moreover, we present a set of modes for classification or reg-
ulatory activities. Finally, the role of parliamentary institutions is highlighted and 
the idea of an ‘algorithmic monitor’ based on crowdsourcing is proposed. 
 
Keywords: regulatory body, parliamentary research service, post legislative scru-
tiny, ENISA, algorithmic monitor. 
 
Should advanced algorithms continue to advance, a structured approach to regu-
late them should be adopted. In this chapter, the development of regulatory bodies 
shall be discussed and the pros and cons of different regulatory concepts will be 
presented, including issues of and opportunities for self-regulation, as well as 
technical considerations. 
Several forms of oversight institutions with regards to algorithms have already 
been established.1 In a resolution on civil law rules on robotics the EP expressed 
its position for the establishment of a ‘(…) European Agency for robotics and arti-
ficial intelligence in order to provide the technical, ethical and regulatory expertise 
needed to support the relevant public actors (…)’.2 At the same time, the Commit-
tee tried to approximate the potential operational framework for this prospective 
regulatory agency by mentioning a list of possible duties:3  
• Cross-sectorial and multidisciplinary monitoring of robotics-based applications, 
• Identification of best practice,  
• Recommendation of regulatory measures, 
                                                          
1 A number of references to different proposals for algorithmic regulations, 
such as an AI watchdog, a Machine Learning Commission, a US FDA (Food and 
Drug Administration) for Algorithms etc. is included in Andrews (2017), pp. 10-
11. 
2 See European Parliament (2017), p. 10, §16. 
3 See European Parliament (2017), p. 10, §17. 
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• Definition of new principles and  
• Addressing potential consumer protection issues and systematic challenges. 
The interesting point here is that the proposed agency is not a regulatory body 
in itself. Instead, it would provide public authorities (‘public actors’) at all levels, 
i.e. the European Union and EU member states, with an ethical code of conduct 
and the necessary expertise in order for the latter to proceed to regulatory 
measures, such as recommendations for the implementation of ‘kill switches’ in 
software design.4 The resolution and the related report have stirred up considera-
ble interest triggering a public consultation with the aim to encourage citizens and 
stakeholders to share their thoughts and considerations in the fields of robotics and 
AI.5 However, DG Connect of the European Commission could be mandated to 
fulfil this task, instead of EU establishing another costly and quite probably, inef-
ficient agency. Alternatively, an existing agency such as the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) could be tasked with the 
same mandate, as shall be analyzed below. If not, then there would surely be over-
laps of competencies between all three. 
A preliminary evaluation of the results of the consultation shows that most re-
spondents have positive attitudes towards robotics and AI, while a large majority 
expresses the need for public regulation in the area. Interestingly enough, the re-
spondents also specify that regulation should be conducted at EU and/or interna-
tional level. Some responders go a step further indicating the nature of this body, 
i.e. the Center for Data Innovation suggested the establishment of a new direc-
torate in the EC for the support of technological advancements in the fields of ro-
botics and AI without focusing on ethical or regulatory issues.6 In its response to 
EP’s resolution, the EC admitted its intention to investigate over time several as-
pects and the regulatory dimension of the issue.7  
In the US, a broad discussion over regulatory matters is also taking place. The 
regulatory approach is described as ‘(…) sector-specific, with oversight by a va-
riety of agencies’.8 Scherer proposed the creation of a federal regulatory regime 
for AI under a new legislation he calls Artificial Intelligence Development Act 
(AIDA) by establishing a tort system approach.9 The proposed federal agency 
would consist of two components for policymaking and certification, respectively. 
The establishment of an AI certification process would require companies and de-
                                                          
4 See Hasselbalch (2017). 
5 The public consultation has been launched by the European Parliament's 
Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) in cooperation with the EPRS via the EP 
Committee web space; The relevant document stack and first results are presented 
in JURI (2017), while the summary report is highly anticipated. 
6  See Castro et al. (2017), p. 18.  
7 See Ponce Del Castillo (2017), p. 3.  
8 See Stone et al. (2016), p. 44. 
9 See Scherer (2015), p. 394.  
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velopers to seek certification before bringing an AI product or service onto the 
market.10 The establishment of a ‘Federal Robotics Commission’ –as a part of an 
Einsteinian thought experiment– has also been discussed elsewhere.11 However, 
not everybody is in favor of regulatory bodies and there are also voices worrying 
they could result in hamstringing innovation12, i.e. with too much red tape. The 
basic logic behind this position is that the underlying risk analysis is often inade-
quate, exaggerating risks and downgrading real benefits. 
There have been suggestions to create a ‘trusted third party’ to scrutinize deci-
sions of automated decision-making systems, thus providing an oversight mecha-
nism for the application of advanced algorithms.13 Such a suggestion would make 
sense if implemented on the national level; the sheer amount of complaints and the 
range of applications would constitute a similar super-national authority dysfunc-
tional. Alternatively, a European regulator to audit algorithms - prior to their de-
ployment - is proposed therein.14 
China is actively challenging US leadership in AI through an aggressive five-
year plan (2016-2020). At the heart of China’s science and technology policy 
there is the National Science, Technology and Education Leading Small Group, 
which is headed by The Premier of the State Council.15 He has identified five dis-
tinct agencies responsible for the development and implementation of central gov-
ernment policies in AI, while there are also other centralized agencies responsible 
for sectoral and industry-specific regulation.16  
In order to structure and discuss issues of regulation, a classification in differ-
ent modes may be attempted.17 For instance, depending on the timing of regulation 
(timing mode), one may distinguish between ex-ante, e.g. via administrative deci-
sions or legislation, and ex-post regulation. A classic ex-post regulatory approach 
would be regulation by judicial decisions. Judicial rulings regulate by definition 
after a case has developed. In certain disputes, such as in the Microsoft cases, sev-
eral years of investigations by authorities may precede. Nevertheless, in this early 
stage of the development of advanced algorithms, we consider ex-ante regulation 
far more difficult, since regulatory capacity needs first to be built-up in order to 
                                                          
10 See Scherer (2015), p. 395. 
11 See Calo (2014). 
12 See relevant blog post by O’Sullivan (2017). 
13 See Wachter et al. (2017), p. 98. 
14 See Wachter et al. (2017). 
15 See He (2017), p. 4. 
16 See He (2017).  
17 Five regulatory classes, i.e. ‘modes’ have been proposed: intervention mode, 
hierarchical mode, natural mode, type mode and timing mode; see also Chapter 1 
for definitions and more details; the type and nature modes will be highlighted in 
Chapter 5, during analysis of the case studies.  
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keep up with growing innovation in an increasingly complex interdisciplinary 
field.18  
A further distinction would concern the hierarchy of regulation. Fig. 4.1 pre-
sents a proposal for the hierarchical classification of regulation for advanced algo-
rithms. This may be also linked to the positioning of the regulatory body in the 
chain of multi-level governance. In this regard, a national body, such as an Inde-
pendent State Body (ISB), governmental agency or unit, a supranational body, 
such as an EU agency, or a global intergovernmental body, could be considered as 
appropriate candidates. Depending on its positioning, a regulatory body would 
have a different set of legal instruments at its disposal. These may include tech-
nology standards, pertinent legal frameworks and court rulings of all relevant in-
stances. Standards, such as the Akoma Ntoso V1.0 OASIS standard for legal doc-
uments or the European Case Law Identifier (ECLI) for citing judgments from 
European and national courts,19 may not be used per se in the regulatory process. 
Usually, they first need to be adopted or endorsed by administrative decisions, or 
transposed by regulatory acts in the national or supranational legal orders. We 
then speak of de jure standards.  This can be attributed to the fact that several 
standards are independently developed by standardization bodies, such as the non-
governmental International Organization for Standardization (ISO), or private 
companies.20 In a profound analogy to the sources of international law, additional 
grounds for reaching a regulatory decision may include scholarly opinions, cus-
tomary practices and general principles of law.21  
Another, more liberal, possibility is for a complimentary system of self-
regulation amongst private sector actors, reporting and answerable to the estab-
lished or mandated government body.22 In the social media regime, where Face-
book indisputably enjoys a position of power, an interesting new approach arises. 
According to the company, there are plans to create an ‘independent body’ of ex-
perts, who will take responsibility for content-related decisions.23 Facebook names 
this body ‘Oversight Board’ and underlines its independence, a claim that will 
surely be challenged given that its members are both going to be remunerated and 
supported, in terms of full-time staff, by Facebook itself. Therefore, the idea to 
privatize regulatory action in critical domains, such as private communications 
                                                          
18 See also the relevant Quora contribution by Zhao (2017). 
19 See Akoma Ntoso (2018) and European Council (2011), respectively.  
20 When it comes to standardization, Marx (2017, p. 26) argues that the distinc-
tion between public and private is blurring, as both sectors increasingly co-
regulate. 
21 According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Art. 38 
(1); on the other hand, it is highly questionable whether a regulatory body will ev-
er be able to decide a case ex aequo et bono. 
22 This would belong to the ‘intervention mode’; more on the self-regulatory 
regime in Finck (2017), as well as in Trubek and Trubek (2007).  
23 See Clegg (2019) and the draft charter therein. 
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and public policy discourse, is not likely to find many supporters among regula-
tors, the European ones in particular.  
From the relevant discussion it becomes clear that there is no consensus of how 
regulation should look like or, at least in some cases, what is to be regulated. 
However, should societies come to an agreement on the necessity to regulate ad-
vanced algorithms, and despite the level and the extent of regulation, one needs to 
think about the timing of regulation. Our understanding is that regulation is inevi-
table and needs to be applied, sooner rather than later, in the development cycle of 
technologies related to advanced algorithms, based on the previously mentioned 
consideration that regulators need to be both educated and trained in the early 
stages of this rapidly developing field.  
Currently, possibly with the exception of China, most states and supranational 
state unions, such as the European Union, mainly apply ex-post regulation of ad-
vanced algorithms via judicial decisions of all instances. Our analysis finds that a 
centralized regulatory model is favored among most scholars and stakeholders. In 
the EU, this could take the form of an EU agency, as mentioned above, but a hy-
brid approach of a central agency with national offices could also be considered 
given the scattered nature of legal order in each EU member state.24 ENISA, given 
its existing status as an EU agency and its mandate could be an interesting incuba-
tor for developing regulatory expertise on advanced algorithms, particularly when 
considering that it has conducted related work.25 Thus, a future regulatory body 
could be an ENISA spin-off that incorporates both existing technical know-how 
and advisory expertise.  
On the national level, this body would be complemented by institutions in the 
form of existing or, where not present, new ISBs. These institutions would be the 
eyes and ears of the competent EU agency at the member state level. Not only 
would they be responsible for transposing EU guidelines and regulations into the 
national legal framework, but they could also be used as a local observatory for is-
sues of algorithmic relevance. This so-called ‘algorithmic monitor’ could use the 
capacity of the crowd, i.e. crowdsourcing,26 in order to spot early and analyze cas-
es where algorithmic regulation may apply. Fig. 4.2 depicts a principal design of 
an algorithmic monitor. It relies on the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to collect infor-
mation on specific algorithms or areas that may require regulation. These raw pro-
                                                          
24 See, for instance, the organization and operation of both the European Patent 
Office (EPO) and the national patent offices. The central instance, the EPO, has 
taken the form of an intergovernmental organization. Another option could be the 
an analogon to ENISA, an agency for network and information security, that 
works together with EU member states and the private sector to deliver strategic 
advice and solutions. 
25 See relevant ENISA report on privacy and data protection by Danezis et al. 
(2015). 
26 Orozco (2016) analyzes, among others, the effects of crowdsourcing on legal, 
regulatory and policy issues. 
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posals need to undergo a processing step, which may include filtering, prioritiza-
tion and deeper analysis. The output of the aforementioned process would then be 
made available for study by a supervisory body or regulatory agency, which by 
definition have limited capacity to equally handle any incoming proposal or com-
plaint.27 
Parliaments are democracy’s supreme institutions. As algorithms play an in-
creasingly important role in people’s lives, their role in algorithmic regulation 
needs to be discussed. As a matter of fact, we consider the parliament’s involve-
ment so significant that it deserves a dedicated study. One may define at least two 
major situations where a national parliament28 may express opinion, guide or di-
rectly regulate in cases that involve advanced algorithms. Again, one must differ-
entiate between the ex-ante and the ex-post approach. Here, the point of reference 
would be formed by the time a specific algorithm or a special category of algo-
rithms29 hits the market or becomes widely operational outside the developer’s 
confined testbed.  
Most times, the ex-ante regulation would equal the standard legislative ap-
proach. This is considered as the most demanding stage, as legal drafts are usually 
prepared by the government and then submitted to the parliament for subsequent 
amendments and discussion. National parliaments retain the right to submit pro-
posals of law. However, in the case of complex topics such as advanced algo-
rithms, it may be doubted whether or not parliaments own the internal capacity to 
study in-depth and subsequently formulate adequate legal provisions. Beyond le-
gal elaboration, after a law has passed, one is entering the regime of parliamentary 
control. Modern parliaments apply new methods for screening implementation of 
a law known as Post-Legislative Scrutiny (PLS).30 Nevertheless, to date, most par-
liaments lack sufficient capacity to systematically follow up on the implementa-
tion of passed legislation. Instead, the traditional system of –written or oral– ques-
tions is used by parliamentary groups and MPs to exercise parliamentary control. 
PLS can be a domain where parliaments may increase their leverage against the 
executive, particularly when related to the evaluation of regulations related to ad-
vanced algorithms. 
In the parliamentary context, the ex-post regulatory approach to advanced algo-
rithms would be similar to the one that a parliament uses on several occasions. 
This would involve the forming of parliamentary committee(s), hereafter commit-
tee(s), in order to discuss a topic on algorithmic regulation. The type of the com-
                                                          
27 It may also be noted that the algorithmic monitor may be an algorithm on its 
own, which automatically screens, prioritizes and forwards the most ‘significant’ 
regulatory proposals to its human operators.  
28 That supranational parliaments may play a role has been already demonstrat-
ed in the case of the European Parliament (2017). 
29 For instance, algorithms that are utilized in HFAT constitute a special catego-
ry that is regulated by the EU’s MiFID II legislative framework. 
30 See De Vrieze and Hasson (2017). 
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mittee also defines its importance within the parliamentary universe.31 Committees 
usually have the right to invite external experts, such as academics or consultants, 
to present their opinion and throw light on the issues discussed, while parliaments 
may also form research or advisory committees with non-MPs as members. 
Furthermore, parliaments have the right to discuss in the competent committees 
or even in the plenary a report submitted by an agency, just like the proposed EU 
agency on algorithmic regulation, or a national ISB. Undoubtedly, this would con-
stitute the least invasive option, since no new parliamentary bodies would have to 
be formed and one could rely on existing procedures without the need to change 
the standing orders. Typically, such discussions result in a resolution that is ad-
dressed to the competent Ministry or the Government as a whole, which is then 
called to transform it to relevant administrative actions, e.g. draft laws or adminis-
trative decrees. However, practice has shown that the result of parliamentary ac-
tion is usually non-tangible and of limited regulatory impact. 
Parliamentary Research Services (PaRS) can have a significant role in 
strengthening the operations and impact of representative institutions. This is why 
most Parliaments have established PaRS and continue to invest considerable re-
sources in their further development.32 In order to fulfill their role at the highest 
possible level, PARS are necessary to employ highly skilled researchers that have 
advanced expertise in a wide range of fields.33 The work of researchers can be 
linked to the application of scientific methodology, the following of a code of 
conduct and, most importantly, the publication of elaborated material.34 In recent 
years, an increasing demand for more complex and synthetic information from 
PaRS can be attested. Advanced algorithms constitute a wide and active field of 
study and PaRS have the potential to:  
‘(…) provide internal and external clients with independent, well-researched, timely, 
structured and concentrated knowledge products, thus counterbalancing partisan 
information flows or even governmental superiority in analysis and dissemination of 
information’.35  
In order to be able to do so, PaRS clearly need to significantly advance their 
relevant capacity, mainly in scientific fields, such as big data, data ethics and legal 
informatics, for example. 
                                                          
31 Parliamentary committees may be formed on a regular or ad-hoc basis. These 
are also several levels of committees, such as Standing Committees, Permanent 
Committees, Special Permanent Committees etc., according to their significance 
in the parliamentary context. 
32 The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the International Federation of Li-
brary Associations and Institutions (IFLA) have published in 2015 guidelines for 
PaRS in order to help developing legislatures to establish research services as well 
as to strengthen existing ones; see IPU and IFLA (2015). 
33 On the researcher role in parliaments see Fitsilis (2018), pp. E-48–E-50. 
34 See Fitsilis (2018).  
35 See Fitsilis and Koutsogiannis (2017), p. 11. 
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Fig. 4.1 Hierarchical mode of regulation for advanced algorithms  
 
Fig. 4.2 Principal design of an algorithmic monitor  
5 Conclusions and Outlook     
Fotios Fitsilis 
Abstract    
This book offers a new perspective in the discussion around the subject of regula-
tion of advanced algorithms. It presents a number of significant cases where 
changes in the code and/or the conduct of its developers or operators have been 
imposed following administrative or judicial decisions. But the existing legal 
weaponry is often insufficient to directly confront the array of problems related to 
advanced algorithms. Therefore, the administrative state must begin to employ in-
novative steps and perhaps aggressive approaches, in order to meet and respond to 
the challenges highlighted in this book. 
 
Keywords: disinformation, algorithmic malpractice, code of conduct, algorithmic 
monitor, legislative regulation. 
 
The use of algorithms is not something new, but today’s advanced algorithms are 
indeed far different and more evolved compared to those of the past. In modern 
digital societies, people conduct confidential and private communications via 
complex algorithms owned by multinational corporations. That this may result in 
massive abuse of private data has been demonstrated in the recent Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, which involved the collection of personally identifiable infor-
mation of millions of Facebook users, in order to influence US voters during a 
run-up to a general election. Those revelations led to widespread discussions on 
the regulation of algorithms and secured Facebook’s CEO a testimony to Senate 
committees as well as to the EUP about the company’s data collection practices.1 
As a result, some scholars support the case that important decisions should always 
remain in the hands of humans, thus eliminating fears of such decisions being 
made in a non-transparent way and without any accountability or recourse.2  
Democracy itself may very well have died back in its birthplace in Athens, 
Greece, some 2500 years ago. Contemporary ‘democratic’ systems are a mere 
                                                          
1 It is these revelations that may have led Facebook’s CEO to call for more 
online regulation and a ‘more active role for governments and regulators’; see 
Zuckerberg (2019).  
2 See, e.g., Coglianese and Lehr (2017), p. 26, in combination with Van Loo 
(2017), p. 1274. 
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evolution of the original notion. One simply needs to ask the question whether our 
western democratic systems are in the position to sufficiently govern societies of 
billions. Well, maybe they are not. In this sense, any recommendation towards an 
alternative approach in governance is more than welcome.3 Under these circum-
stances, the role of advanced algorithms in contemporary and future democracies 
deserves more analysis, a giant task that is out of the scope of this book.4  
Yet, in this regard, it is worth mentioning that the issue of disinformation raises 
broader concerns of societal harm. In the worst-case scenario, the impact of disin-
formation campaigns can affect entire societies, be that through interference in 
election, or misinformation about foods, or medicines. The stakes involved in ac-
curately identifying disinformation are high because it often affects free exchange 
of ideas and information, the core of political discourse, a point that should be of 
particular concern to parliaments. Notably, in an effort to understand the spread 
and impact of disinformation as well as ensuring the transparency of the 2019 Eu-
ropean Elections, digital platforms including Facebook, Google and Twitter 
signed up to a voluntary EU Code of Practice on disinformation.5 Moreover, 
Google laid out a process to curb fake news as malicious actors have attempted to 
harm or deceive on-line search users through a wide range of actions.6 Not to be 
underestimated in terms of its regulatory impact is also the relevant announcement 
by the G20 Trade Ministers and Digital Economy Ministers that ‘AI actors should 
respect the rule of law, human rights and democratic value, (…)’.7  
Since the invasion of new technologies into our lives seems inevitable and at 
the same time very profitable for a series of private actors, it is evident, more than 
ever, that the administrative state needs to adjust to this new digital environment. 
This book has therefore offered some new perspectives in the discussion around 
the regulation of advanced algorithms by presenting a number of significant cases 
where changes in software have been imposed following administrative or judicial 
decisions. These cases have been classified and analyzed in order to provide in-
sights to the inner mechanisms of algorithmic regulation.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Hence, the significance of the contribution by Runciman (2018). 
4 Nevertheless, this can be linked to our proposal to work on underlying legal 
values and principles rather than to produce scores of regulation. 
5 See European Commission (2019); the Code is an initiative of the European 
Commission (2018). 
6 These actions include for instance tricking online systems in order to promote 
their own content (via a set of practices referred to as ‘spam’), propagating mal-
ware, and engaging in illegal acts online, Google (2019). 
7 See G20 (2019), p. 11; this is the first time the countries that represent 
world’s top economies agreed upon a set of principles for ‘responsible steward-
ship of trustworthy AI’, which may serve as guidelines for national and suprana-
tional regulatory policies. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of analyzed topics on advanced algorithms 
Table 5.1 presents a wide overview of the topics of regulation this book refers 
to. The ‘type mode’ of regulation, which consists of the legislative and judicial 
regulatory approach, is displayed, along with the relevant regulatory acts, such as 
directives, regulations, laws and decrees, or legal action that may apply to each 
case. In case a higher instance has confirmed a decision of a lower court, the indi-
cated case(s) may deviate from the one(s) discussed under the relevant topic.8 Fi-
nally, the regulatory outcome is indicated, i.e. whether regulation has been im-
posed on the environment or the controller (indirect regulation), or on the 
algorithm itself (direct regulation). We speak here of the nature of regulation 
(‘natural mode’).  
Not all cases that involve algorithms are cases of direct regulation, in terms of 
imposing (or aiming at) changes directly to the algorithm,9 such as in the Mi-
crosoft Windows Media Player case, which led to the creation of ‘Windows XP 
N’, a Windows operating system without the media player10. Some cases may re-
late to pure labor issues,11 or competition12 or restrictive measures to the developer 
/ controller of an algorithm.13 There, regulation may be regarded as ‘indirect’, i.e. 
when conditions are imposed on the surrounding environment of the algorithm or 
its controller. It is difficult to tell, whether classification according to the natural 
mode provides any hints regarding the gravity of intervention. This may be the 
case, to the extent regulation affects the viability of the underlying business model 
the algorithm serves or its principal functionality. Given the lack of appropriate 
general regulatory principles on algorithmic regulation, or a sector specific legal 
framework, ‘traditional’ legal instruments, such as competition law, have been 
frequently used for algorithmic regulation. Classification in regulatory types may 
also include the timing of the intervention.14 
Hence, overall we classify regulation into five modes and their respective sub-
classes, according to the type (legislative or judicial), nature (direct or indirect), 
timing (ex-ante or ex-post) and form of the intervention (command-and-control, 
self-regulation or co-regulation). These are embedded into a vertical dimension, 
the ‘hierarchical mode’ (global/supranational/national). With the form of interven-
                                                          
8 See for instance Section 3.6: Algorithmic trading regulation. 
9 The notion of change in the architecture of the code is described by Lessig 
(1999), pp. 505-506. 
10 See EC Decision of 24 March 2004, case COMP/C-3/37.392. 
11 Razak v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2:16-cv-00573. 
12 Philadelphia Taxi Assoc. Inc. v. Uber, 17-1871. 
13 The MiFID II / MiFIR framework and the GDPR offer several such provi-
sions. 
14 Usually, the ‘type mode’ is equivalent to the ‘timing mode’; however, this 
may not always be the case, as shown in Chapter 1. 
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tion already presented elsewhere15 and the ‘hierarchical mode’ being intrinsic to 
any form of regulation, we hereby underline the importance of the remaining three 
modes, i.e. ‘type’, ‘nature’ and ‘timing’, for providing added-value to the sur-
rounding discussion. Fig. 5.1 visualizes these regulatory modes and depicts their 
attributes and interrelations.  
The EU and US cases, which involve anti-competitive bundling of Microsoft’s 
internet browser and media player with the underlying operating systems, have 
been paramount in shaping the computer and software industry. Regulation here 
was achieved by judicial decisions rather than using a specific legal framework. 
However, in both legal orders, anti-competitive provisions of Art. 101 and 102 
TFEU16 and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act have been used as a 
general legal basis. Interestingly, the settlement achieved by Microsoft in the US 
did not require the company to alter the code by removing IE from its operating 
system. An EC decision against Microsoft, affirmed in its essence by the Court of 
First Instance, forced Microsoft to create a different version of its operating sys-
tem without the Windows Media Player. 
In the VW diesel emissions case, US investigators found out that the company 
had used a defeat device in the form of an illegal algorithmic switch, which sensed 
the operating conditions of the vehicle and adjusted gas emissions accordingly. 
Within the context of the present book, the basic US case17 has been discussed as 
well as the relevant settlements as VW pled guilty to a series of criminal and civil 
charges. At the same time, the legal framework in the EU at the time did not allow 
for an analogous prosecution of VW on a European level. What is of particular in-
terest is the fact that VW, both in the US and the EU, has not been explicitly urged 
to immediately cease using the mentioned defeat device. Only after talks with the 
EC, VW committed to resolve the issue for the European consumers via a soft-
ware update.  
The inter-relations between online privacy, digital marketing and fair competi-
tion have been discussed before German courts in an interesting case of legitimacy 
in using ad-blocking software. Following legal action from Axel Springer AG, a 
private media company, BGH, the German Federal Court, declared the operation 
of AdBlock Plus lawful. According to the Court, any (financial) damage was not 
caused by the software provider but by the users who downloaded the ad blocker. 
In addition, it was noted that media companies have always the possibility to 
block users that use ad-blocking software. 
The boundaries of the personal right to block online controversial content, 
which is widely known as the 'right to be forgotten', have been set by the CJEU in 
its landmark judgement of the case Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. AEPD 
                                                          
15 In a Communication by the European Commission (2016, p. 5), self-
regulation and co-regulation mechanisms are suggested as command-and-control 
alternatives for regulating platform economy. 
16 Formerly known as Art. 81 and 82 ECT, respectively.  
17 US v. Volkswagen, 16-CR-20394. 
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and González. The Court’s ruling, which applies to search engines with a branch 
or subsidiary in the EU, provides data subjects with the right to have their personal 
information removed from relevant searches on the basis of their name, even if 
this information appears on the indexed pages in a lawful way. Search engine op-
erators have to comply with such requests while keeping a number of factors in 
balance such as their own economic viability and the right of access to infor-
mation of the general public. The ‘right to be forgotten’ has been incorporated in 
Art. 17 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 that has significant implications both for sys-
tem operators/controllers and the utilized software/algorithms. 
The sharing economy, as expressed through the Airbnb and Uber cases, took 
traditional industries by surprise. In numerous countries worldwide, the latter are 
seeking state or judicial protection in order to avoid collapse. Both Airbnb and 
Uber rely on algorithms that match supply with demand with the companies cash-
ing a small provision when the arranged service has been provided. In the home-
sharing cases, such as the case of Airbnb,18 local regulators, e.g. city administra-
tion, or the central government, are imposing strict limitations to the landlords. On 
the other hand, in several cases, platforms are asked not to list any offers that have 
not been declared with the competent authorities and do not bear an official regis-
tration number. In the Uber case, most resistance comes from the traditionally 
strong taxi-service syndicates. A couple of US lawsuits19 have been handpicked in 
order to present the state of play in the car-sharing business. Similarly, to a differ-
ent case concerning ad-blocking in Germany, Axel Springer AG v. Eyeo, competi-
tion laws have been invoked in the first lawsuit to protect the existing status quo in 
the industry. With argumentation analogous, to a certain extent, to the BGH rul-
ing, the US Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s arguments by stating that the 
taxi association had no right to exclude competitors from the market. This implies 
that taxi companies would need to become more competitive in order to continue 
to be viable in this business.20 The second pending case involves allegations of al-
gorithmic manipulation by Uber that contain parallels with the VW emissions 
case. 
Algorithmic trading and HFAT have been at the center of regulatory policies 
and judicial decisions as they bear potential for serious market distortion. In recent 
years, the European Union has pioneered financial markets regulation through 
                                                          
18 Regulation applies to other online platforms as well, such as Homestay, 
Couchsurfing, Home Exchange, Wimdu, Bedycasa and Culture Go Go. 
19 The two lawsuits are Philadelphia Taxi Assoc. Inc. v. Uber, 17-1871 and 
Sorvano v. Uber, 2:17-cv-02550-DMG-JEM. 
20 The analogy with the BGH ruling lies in the fact that the German Federal 
Court stated that there is no general market obstruction and that the plaintiff seek-
ing judicial protection must become active in order to ‘protect’ its business. What 
is remarkable here is the fact that competition law has been used for the judicial 
reasoning in different legal orders both in the EU (in Union and member state lev-
el) and the US. 
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MiFID and the MiFID II / MiFIR framework. In the US, the regulatory framework 
involves the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Based on the latter, unlawful HFAT practices have been prosecuted and the out-
come of a significant case in the US has been discussed. In this complex field, 
regulations are imposed to both algorithms, which are to operate within certain 
limits, as well as to the controllers and trading venues, such as strict reporting re-
quirements and rules on the admission of financial instruments to trading. 
Following rapid developments in technology and learning from cases of the 
past, some of which have been discussed herein, the EU went a decisive step fur-
ther towards an ex-ante regulation of personal data protection. This action by the 
EU institutions took the form of a Regulation, the GDPR. The GDPR contains 
some relevant legal principles from pre-existing data protection law, enriches 
them and incorporates new elements for enhanced personal data protection. In the 
present context, the concepts of data protection by design and by default have been 
analyzed and some special parameters of data processing, such as 
pseudonymization and data minimization have been discussed.  
The present book examined therefore a series of major cases where advanced 
algorithms came to play. One of the issues that has been investigated dealt with 
the research question as to whether existing legal instruments are sufficient to con-
front an array of problems related to advanced algorithms. Legislative (or ex-ante) 
regulation in a field that leaps forward proves indeed difficult. Analysis shows that 
despite ongoing algorithmisation of administrative decisions and private opera-
tions, only the EU and possibly China (although the level of analysis herein is not 
sufficient) are proceeding with a general legislative framework to regulate algo-
rithmic conduct. The EU is expressing its will to be a front-runner in establishing 
a general legislative framework for algorithmic regulation. In this regard, the 
GDPR and MiFID II, in data privacy and algorithmic trading regulation respec-
tively, offer clear indications of a more aggressive centralized approach compared 
to the US. On the other hand, the US is more decisive when it comes to legal ac-
tion, with its prosecutors even charging perpetrators with criminal charges, such as 
in the VW case, which itself amounted to commercial fraud and intended 
misselling of a product. 
Nevertheless, even a firm regulatory framework cannot foresee any biases in 
algorithms or reveal algorithmic malpractices. This can only be achieved through 
in-depth investigations and thorough analysis by appropriate and highly special-
ized bodies. In this regard, the establishment of a relevant agency for algorithmic 
regulation and control is proposed. According to the approach presented herein, 
however, it is not necessary to establish a new institution or agency from scratch. 
In order to save valuable time and resources,21 the competencies of an existing 
agency could be expanded in order to cover the aforementioned issues. Hence, 
                                                          
21 See relevant discussion on the EU level on the establishment of an agency 
with market surveillance powers to oversee road transport. Here the main argu-
ments against it focused on the high cost for its implementation. 
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given the nature of advanced algorithms, such as complexity and early stage of 
development, this contribution to the field considers ENISA, a European agency 
that focuses on network and information security, or an appropriate spin-off, to be 
an interesting candidate for this role.  
National or supranational parliaments could also play an important role in algo-
rithmic regulation, particularly in the course of their oversight function. Their role 
could be further strengthened by establishing special mechanisms for following up 
implementation of laws and by-laws, a process that is called post-legislative scru-
tiny. For this, it is necessary to increase their administrative and scientific capaci-
ty, through for example further development of their parliamentary research ser-
vices. In view of the rise of advanced algorithms and the overall significance of 
representative institutions in democratic societies, a dedicated study should be 
conducted in order to analyze the parameters and conditions under which parlia-
ments could contribute in the field of algorithmic regulation.   
A solid legal framework is a non-plus-ultra to achieve quick and well-founded 
legal decisions in the many legal disputes that are going to take place in the time 
yet to come. As several cases where algorithms come to play have been legally as-
sessed, scrutiny illustrates that the existing legal weaponry is still not sufficient to 
directly and efficiently regulate advanced algorithms. Instead, antitrust and com-
petition laws have been utilized in many of the discussed cases. In a rapidly de-
veloping field with ever shortening life cycles of advanced algorithms and of the 
related software products or platforms, yearlong investigations in such disputes 
will practically result in a denial of justice. Specialized, rather than general,22 leg-
islation, such as EU’s GDPR/MiFID II, cooperation between state institutions 
around the globe, such as in the Microsoft cases, and the evolution of dedicated 
agencies, will be necessary to spot problematic algorithmic cases and efficiently 
tackle related issues even before they arise. An alternative approach would be an 
attempt to develop a rigid regime of legal values, along with a set of related rights 
that apply while designing, implementing and operating advanced algorithms.23 
The definition of those values and rights should be affected on the supranational 
level, such as in the form of a convention or resolution, rather than at the national 
level and it is a prerequisite for them to be applied by judges in an efficient man-
ner.  
Overall, in the wide regime of advanced algorithms, technology moves faster 
than governments can address its effects and a clear governmental regulatory pat-
tern does not seem to exist. But even in cases of regulation through administrative 
decisions, the competitive nature of the research field and the projections of its fu-
ture market value may result in a situation where those decisions are always con-
tested in front of the competent courts and even up to the highest instance. As a 
result, judicial (or ex-post) regulation is the rule. This is not expected to change in 
future algorithmic cases, even with further development of dedicated specialized 
                                                          
22 E.g. competition or labor law 
23 The newly forged ‘right to be forgotten’ may constitute such a right. 
75 
legislation. Hence, the –constitutional– right to a speedy trial could be guaranteed 
by the definition of general legal values applicable to algorithmic cases, as men-
tioned previously.    
Algorithmic malpractices, such as concerns regarding discrimination and 
breach of privacy, just to name a few, are subject of a heated debate. While regula-
tors may ensure that data subjects are protected against private sector offenders, a 
legitimate question to be asked is whether these are also sufficiently protected 
from algorithmic malpractices by state organs. Differently formulated, and in the 
absence of tailored legal values, how can it be ensured that the basic principles of 
public law, such as non-discrimination, accountability, transparency, are not being 
violated by the state itself? The outcome of our on-going investigation to this 
question is of particular significance, as it touches upon fundamental individual 
and collective rights that are essential for the functionality of modern democratic 
societies. The development of a code of conduct for public sector agencies, the es-
tablishment of an ‘ethics advocate’ or a mere ‘trusted third party’, who represents 
an independent and trustworthy expert24 within critical public service units and 
continuous professional training on privacy, legitimacy and democratic values, all 
constitute efficient tools to counterbalance informational superiority of the State 
against private data subjects and to ensure the legality of its actions.  
The main parameters that have been analyzed for each of the described cases 
were location (EU, US or elsewhere), administrative or judicial reasoning and le-
gal basis. As a next step, the geographical criterion could be expanded to cover 
more cases from other continents. A general finding of the book is that the Euro-
pean Union is quick in taking legislative action, whereas the US is quick in taking 
legal action. Further cases of algorithmic regulation are necessary to be studied to 
support this claim, however. Additional research is also necessary to determine the 
operational framework of a mechanism to screen cases where algorithms come to 
play and potentially need regulation. This so-called ‘algorithmic monitor’, which 
could also involve crowdsourcing, is considered to offer essential input to the 
work of a regulatory body. The form and operation of such an apparatus requires 
significant study itself.  
Concluding, despite the aforementioned concerns that come with the use of al-
gorithms, governments should not be hesitant to invest in their immense possibili-
ties to ameliorate the administrative state. Still, such technologies are not ripe 
enough and we should use the time for the planning of regulatory principles and 
law-making. Scientific foresight and forward-thinking legal assessment should be 
widely employed in order to determine and regulate the effects of advanced algo-
rithms in and for future societies.    
                                                          
24 Alternatively, a body of experts could be regarded, depending on the com-
plexity and significance of the administrative decisions to be made. 
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Institution/Organization  Identifier Title Year 
Article 29 Working Party (WP29) 17/EN - 
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Regulation 2016/679 
2018 
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